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Auctioning the Upzone
Christopher S. Elmendorf and Darien Shanske†
Abstract
This Article proposes a new framework for inducing cities with
severely supply-constrained housing markets to allow a lot more highdensity housing. Local governments that rezone for larger buildings
would (with the approval of a state agency) be permitted to auction,
and thus profit from, the newly created buildable space. Winning
bidders would acquire tradeable development allowances, which
developers would have to acquire and redeem as a condition of project
approval. We argue that this framework would expand the supply and
density of urban housing through three channels. First, it would enable
municipal governments to capture much more of the economic value
created by upzoning and regulatory streamlining than they do today,
which in turn would create new and better opportunities for local
political entrepreneurs to assemble pro-development coalitions. Second,
our framework would make local upzoning and regulatory streamlining
deals more durable than they are today. This is so because local factions
whose policy goals align with the state housing agency’s would be able
to use auction contracts and state law to entrench their policies, and
because the after-auction allowance market would act as a shock
absorber, reducing allowance prices as necessary to offset regulatory
and other shocks to the cost of development. Third, our framework
would help to rectify informational asymmetries that presently hinder
state oversight of local land-use plans.
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Introduction
This Article begins with a puzzle. Americans who identify as
Democrats tend to have very different land-use preferences than those
who identify as Republicans.1 Many Democrats, given their druthers,
would prefer to live in dense, diverse, walkable communities; whereas
Republicans generally favor the classic suburban ideal of single-family
homes on large lots.2 These personal preferences line up with larger
ideological commitments. Urban lifestyles have smaller carbon
footprints,3 and diverse communities are more conducive to socio–
1.

See Jonathan Mummolo & Clayton Nall, Why Partisans Do Not Sort:
The Constraints on Political Segregation, 79 J. Pol. 45, 46–49 (2016)
(reviewing literature).

2.

Id. at 50.

3.

See Gabriel Ahlfeldt & Elisabetta Pietrostefani, Demystifying Compact Urban
Growth: Evidence from 300 Studies from Across the World 32 (Coalition for
Urban Transitions, working paper, 2017), https://newclimateeconomy.report/
workingpapers/workingpaper/demystifying-compact-urban-growth/ [https://
perma.cc/K854-4MHJ] (reporting estimate from meta-analysis of studies
of impact of densification on carbon emissions). See generally Stephen M.
Wheeler et al., Carbon Footprint Planning: Quantifying Local and State
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economic mobility.4 Yet (and here is the puzzle) Democratic
policymakers have done very little to repurpose for dense urban
development land that was zoned for suburban uses long ago. If one
could watch time-lapse films of metropolitan development in “red” and
“blue” states, one would notice some differences: more suburban sprawl
in the red states; more protected parks and open space in the blue
states. But the commonalities would be even more striking: since World
War II, there has been virtually no intensification of land use in existing
residential neighborhoods.5
In the early-twentieth century, it was common for developers in
booming cities to tear down existing single-family homes and replace
them with small apartment buildings.6 Yet by the 1940s, this pattern
was nowhere to be seen.7 The spread of zoning evidently put an end to
it.8 In city after city, affluent homeowners prevailed upon municipal
officials to zone out “parasitic” apartment buildings from their neigh–
borhoods.9

Mitigation Opportunities for 700 California Cities, 3 Urb. Plan. 35
(2018).
4.

See Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography
of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. Econ. 1553,
1555–56 (2014) (finding that racial and socioeconomic homogeneity is
negatively correlated with intergenerational mobility); Arthur Acolin &
Susan Wachter, Opportunity and Housing Access, 19 Cityscape 135, 135
(2017) (finding that “areas[] from which lower-income households are
increasingly priced out, [economically thriving but supply-constrained
cities] are also more likely to have higher levels of intergenerational
mobility.”).

5.

See Issi Romem, America’s New Metropolitan Landscape: Pockets of
Dense Construction in a Dormant Suburban Interior, Buildzoom (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/pockets-of-dense-construction-ina-dormant-suburban-interior [https://perma.cc/C9BQ-QAKT] (using
building-permit data to chart development patterns).

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

See Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket: Evidence from the
Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin 5 (Jan. 7, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (explaining how restrictive
zoning ordinances suppress housing production), available at https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3507803 [https://perma.cc/ZDZ9V8L2].

9.

The U.S. Supreme Court characterized apartment buildings as “parasite[s]”
in its seminal decision upholding the constitutionality of a municipality’s
zoning power. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394
(1926) (“[V]ery often the apartment house is a mere parasite [in
neighborhoods of detached homes], constructed in order to take advantage
of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential
character of the district.”).
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Today, despite skyrocketing demand that has pushed the price of
new apartments and condominiums far above the cost of construction
in the most economically productive American metropolises,10 vast
swaths of the cityscape remain zoned exclusively for single-family
homes.11 Homeowners strongly resist intensifying land use in their
neighborhoods, and they wield outsized influence in local politics by
voting and otherwise participating at disproportionally high rates.12
Because of this, the vision of the thriving city as an engine of socio–
10.

See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of
Housing Supply, 32 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 13 tbl.2 (2018) (showing growth
in share of U.S. municipalities with housing prices more than 25% greater
than construction costs); Issi Romem, Paying for Dirt: Where Have Home
Values Detached from Construction Costs?, Buildzoom (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/paying-for-dirt-where-have-home-valuesdetached-from-construction-costs [https://perma.cc/C3US-6JJK] (providing
metro-area estimates of home values relative to construction costs). In a
competitive market that is not supply-constrained, housing prices in the
long run will be very close to construction costs. See Glaeser & Gyourko,
supra.

11.

See, e.g., Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an
American Ideal: A House with a Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. Times (June
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/upshot/
cities-across-america-question-single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/
5BYK-AMJH] (mapping share of land zoned for single-family homes in
ten cities).

12.

See generally Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like
Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism, 112 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 473 (2018) (regarding differences in land-use preferences
between homeowners and renters); William Marble & Clayton Nall,
Where Interests Trump Ideology: Homeownership’s Persistent Role in
Local Housing Development Politics (Oct. 23, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http://www.nallresearch
.com/uploads/7/9/1/7/7917910/interest.3.3.pdf; Mark Baldassare et
al., Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal., Californians & Their Government
(2019), available at https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/ppicstatewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5QDS-WZXM] (same). Regarding differences in political
participation between homeowners and renters, see Andrew Hall & Jesse
Yoder, Does Homeownership Influence Political Behavior? Evidence from
Administrative Data (Mar. 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (reviewing literature and estimating causal effect of becoming
a homeowner on political participation); Brian J McCabe, Are Homeowners
Better Citizens? Homeownership and Community Participation in the
United States, 91 Soc. Forces 929, 947–48 (2013) (finding that
homeownership positively correlates with turnout in elections but not with
forms of civic participation that do not affect value of home); Katherine
L. Einstein et al., Who Participates in Local Government? Evidence from
Meeting Minutes, 17 Persp. on Pol. 28 (2019) (studying minutes of
planning and zoning board meetings in Boston area and finding that
homeowners are vastly overrepresented among people who comment on
land use issues, and nearly always speak in opposition to proposed
developments).
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economic mobility is increasingly a thing of the past.13 In today’s highcost cities, the wage premium paid to low-skilled workers no longer
offsets the cost of rent.14
The problem of the housing-supply-constrained city has very
serious consequences for socioeconomic mobility, the environment, and
national economic welfare.15 Policymakers are starting to pay attention,
prodded by a nascent Yes In My Backyard (“YIMBY”) movement that
is challenging incumbent homeowners’ prerogative to keep their
neighborhoods just as they have “always” been.16 The YIMBYs have
scored some early victories. After a public reckoning with the racist
history of single-family zoning, the Minneapolis City Council voted in
2018 to authorize four-unit dwellings on every lot in the city and to
allow taller and denser buildings along transit corridors.17 The state of
Oregon followed suit with a 2019 statute that requires larger cities to
allow duplexes or fourplexes on all parcels zoned for residential use.18 A
number of other states have directed local governments to allow socalled “accessory dwelling units” in single-family neighborhoods.19
No state, however, has made much headway getting cities to allow
substantially larger buildings in previously low-density residential

13.

See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of
Residential Stagnation, 127 Yale L.J. 78 (2017); Peter Ganong & Daniel
Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102
J. Urb. Econ. 76 (2017).

14.

Hankinson, supra note 12, at 2–5.

15.

Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as
Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 Hastings L.J. 79, 92 (2019).

16.

See generally Kenneth Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New ProHousing Movement Overcome the Power of NIMBYs?, 41 Zoning &
Plan. L. Rep. 1 (2018).

17.

Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes
to End Single-Family Zoning, N.Y. Times (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolis-single-family-zoning.html
[https://perma.cc/8DUY-QLTM].

18.

Laura Bliss, Oregon’s Single-Family Zoning Ban Was a ‘Long Time
Coming’, Citylab (July 2, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/
07/oregon-single-family-zoning-reform-yimby-affordable-housing/593137/
[https://perma.cc/8QA6-7XD9]; H.B. 2001, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 2 (Or. 2019)(the duplex/fourplex requirement applies to cities of
more than 10,000 or 25,000 people, respectively).

19.

See generally Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 83; John Infranca, Housing
Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory
Dwelling Units, 25 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 53, 68 (2014). California,
Oregon, Washington, and New Jersey have also pushed local governments
to rezone for somewhat greater density by establishing “default densities”
that provide a safe harbor against certain requirements under state law.
See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 54 n.283.
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neighborhoods.20 In California, state senator Scott Wiener made waves
in 2018 and 2019 by introducing bills that would require local
governments to permit four- to five-story buildings within one-quarter
mile of a transit stop, but the legislature’s Democratic leadership
deemed the idea too incendiary and doused it.21 Similar bills were also
introduced in 2019 in Washington and Oregon, but each failed to
receive even a favorable committee vote.22
This Article proposes a new tool to induce high-cost cities to
accommodate more housing: the state-supervised development-rights
auction. Local governments that expand their zoning envelopes
pursuant to a state-approved plan would be entitled to auction, and
thus profit from, the newly created developable space. We argue that
this auction model would bring about greater residential density
through three channels. First, it would enable municipal governments
to capture much more of the economic value created by upzoning and
regulatory streamlining than they do today, which in turn would create
new and better opportunities for local political entrepreneurs to
assemble pro-development coalitions. By way of illustration, our backof-the-envelope calculations suggest that auction revenues have the
20.

See generally Romem, supra note 5. See also Issi Romem, Can U.S. Cities
Compensate for Curbing Sprawl by Growing Denser?, Buildzoom (Sept. 14,
2016), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/can-cities-compensate-for-curbingsprawl-by-growing-denser [https://perma.cc/BEC7-X8WV] (noting that
while state laws in Oregon and Washington have induced somewhat
denser development than is typical of other states, “the increase in
[Portland and Seattle’s] rate of housing production pales in comparison to
what similarly-sized cities like Phoenix and Atlanta have achieved
through outward expansion”); Paavo Monkkonen & Spike Friedman,
UCLA Lewis Ctr. for Regional Pol’y Stud., Not Nearly
Enough: California Lacks Capacity to Meet Lofty Housing
Goals 3 (2019) (demonstrating that “zoned capacity” for new residential
in California is strongly skewed toward less productive regions and, within
regions, toward the exurban periphery, notwithstanding state policies
favoring infill development in urban locations), available at
http://www.lewis.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2019/03/2019Planned-Capacity_Monkkonen-Friedman.pdf https://perma.cc/BN7CMG9P].

21.

See Julia Wick, Essential California: Inside the Demise of SB 50, the
State’s Most Talked-about Bill, L.A. Times (May 17, 2019), https://www
.latimes.com/newsletters/la-me-ln-essential-california-20190517-story.html
[https://perma.cc/EDD2-ZCPX] (“The bill died because it was held in
the Senate Appropriations Committee. Essentially, this is a way that the
Legislature can hold bills without having a formal vote, particularly sticky
bills where they don’t want to leave fingerprints on who actually killed
them.”).

22.

See S.B. 5769, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); S.B. 10, 80th Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). For the Washington bill’s status, visit
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5769&Year=2019&ini
tiative; for the Oregon bill’s, visit https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2019R1/
Measures/Overview/SB10.
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potential to double the size of San Francisco’s discretionary general
fund. Second, our model would give local political actors whose policy
preferences align with the state’s a simple tool for entrenching upzoning
and permit-streamlining policies. Third, the model would improve state
oversight of local land-use regulation by reducing informational
asymmetries between the state and local governments.23
This Article’s proposal builds on the work of economists William
Fischel and Robert Nelson, and law professors Rick Hills and David
Schleicher. A generation ago, Fischel and Nelson concluded that local
governments should have more or less unfettered discretion to sell
rezoning for cash.24 More recently, Hills and Schleicher have argued that
so-called “transferable development rights” programs can be used to
redistribute among landowners upzoning’s economic gains, shifting
value toward more politically popular landowners and thereby gener–
ating public support for otherwise tough-to-sell rezonings.25

23.

We are not the only scholars to have conceived of development-rights
auctions. After we published a white paper laying out the idea, a reader
referred us to a couple of studies in Brazil of development-rights auctions,
see infra note 92, and to a proposal from the Canadian economist Tom
Davidoff for development-rights auctions in Vancouver and Toronto.
Thomas Davidoff, Redevelopment Auctions (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors). Professor Vicki Been has also suggested in passing that
an “auction scheme[]” of some sort might improve on existing programs
for awarding density bonuses to developers who contribute publicimprovement funds. See N.Y.U. Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urb.
Pol’y, Buying Sky: The Market for Transferable Development
Rights in New York City 18 (2013), available at https://furmancenter.org/
files/BuyingSky_PolicyBrief_21OCT2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD7AA676]. As best we can tell, however, we are the first to argue for
development-rights auctions not only as a means of value capture, but
also as a device for enabling local pro-housing factions to entrench their
policy preferences, and as a device for rectifying informational asymmetries
between state oversight agencies and local governments.

24.

Nelson envisioned groups of homeowners banding together with the help
of a local government to collectively sell their parcels for redevelopment.
See Robert H. Nelson, Zoning and Property Rights: An Analysis
of the American System of Land-Use Regulation 178–81 (1977).
Fischel, observing that rezoning decisions often instantiate de facto
bargains between a developer, neighborhood groups, and the local
government, sought to facilitate efficient bargains by introducing the
efficient medium of exchange: money. See William A. Fischel, The
Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to
American Land Use Controls 75–101 (1985) (suggesting some fetters,
principally that local governments should not be allowed to sell the right
to develop certain “normal” land uses).

25.

Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions Out of
Thin Air: Transferable Development Rights and “Constituency Effects”
in Land Use Law, 12 J. Leg. Analysis, 79 (2020); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.
& David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 91,
125–27 (2015).
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The common thread running through these scholars’ work is the
notion that if local governments could capture or strategically redist–
ribute more of upzoning’s economic gains, they would allow more
efficient upzoning to occur. This Article starts with the same idea, while
contributing a new mode of value-capture (auctions), and a couple of
new layers to the argument: one about asymmetric entrenchment of
land-use policies; the other about informational barriers to effective
state superintendence of local regulation.
Part I sets the stage by explaining the cumbersome methods local
governments now use to extract value from new residential develop–
ment. These methods either destroy or fail to collect a good part of the
value that upzoning ought to create. Part II introduces the proposal. It
explains the logic of value capture through auctions (relative to presentday alternatives), as well as our rationale for conditioning the local right
to auction development allowances on a state agency’s approval of the
plan. Part III discusses the likely effects of our proposal on the local
political economy of land-use regulation, and on the monitoring
capacity of state agencies charged with overseeing local plans. Part IV
responds to objections. The final Part concludes.26

I.
A.

Value Capture, Done Badly

The Transformation of Zoning: From Nuisance Prevention to Tacit
Value Capture

The original theory of zoning presupposed that land uses should be
separated so that noisome industrial and commercial activities would
not interfere with peaceable residential living. Zoning was envisioned as
a clear-cut, ex-ante substitute for the unpredictable common law of
nuisance.27 Projects conforming to objective requirements—use, height,
bulk, setbacks, etc.—would be permitted “as of right.” The actual
practice of zoning today bears little resemblance to the theory.
Especially in high-cost housing markets, development permitting has
become thoroughly discretionary, often requiring project-by-project
negotiations over design, scale, public benefits, affordable-housing set
asides, and so much more.28 What happened?

26.

One note before proceeding: to keep this Article reasonably short and to
the point, we have omitted the usual literature review about the serious
social costs of urban housing-supply restrictions and the obduracy of lowdensity residential zones. We have cited some of the relevant literature in
this Introduction, see supra notes 5–15, and readers who want a more
extensive review are referred to other work. E.g., Elmendorf, supra note
15, at 86–94 (reviewing literature).

27.

See Robert C. Ellickson & A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Controls:
Cases and Materials 57–60 (3rd ed. 1981).

28.

For an in-depth look at current development-permitting practices in
California, see generally Moira O’Neill et al., Developing Policy from the
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The original theory of zoning was badly eroded by two
developments in the 1970s.29 Home equity, particularly in coastal cities,
began to rise faster than the general level of inflation, and property-tax
bills went up, too.30 This contributed to tax revolts such as California’s
infamous Proposition 13, which dramatically cut property taxes and
strictly limited their future growth. Because property taxes were the
traditional source of local government revenue31—and voters apparently
did not want dramatic cuts to local services—local officials started
looking for other revenue streams. Requiring new development to “pay
its own way” was both politically appealing and theoretically reason–
able.
Under the old pre-Proposition 13 regime, it was expected that new
residential development would support the cost of associated infra–
structure through property taxes paid over time. Proposition 13 (and
similar measures in other states) called this assumption into doubt.
Because new development could no longer be counted on to pay for
itself after the fact, it needed to do so beforehand. “Flexible” zoning
got the job done.32 By establishing discretionary-development regimes,
local officials could condition a project’s approval on the developer’s
provision of public infrastructure, parks, funding for schools, or
whatever else officialdom prioritized at the time.33

Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to Inform California’s
Housing Policy Debates, 25 Hastings Envtl. L.J. 1 (2019).
29.

Other forces, long at work, also contributed to the erosion, such as
planners’ lack of foresight about where development would be most
valuable, and in what form. See Ellickson & Tarlock, supra note 27,
at 75–79 (reviewing literature that challenges the supposition that
planners can foresee where housing-stock growth would be valuable).

30.

See William A. Fischel, Zoning Rules!: The Economics of Land
Use Regulation 212–15 (2015). In an inflationary environment, the
nominal rise in prices translates to a real gain for homeowners who have
a fixed-rate mortgage. Moreover, as Fischel explains, because the nominal
increase in most other investments’ values was subject to capital-gains
taxation, owner-occupied homes became uniquely attractive investments
during the 1970s inflationary period (owing to a capital-gains exclusion).
Id. at 212–13.

31.

See Richard A. Musgrave, The Tax Revolt, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 697, 697–98
(1979).

32.

See Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use
Regulation, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 601 (2010); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt,
Introduction: Exclusionary Land-Use Regulations, 41 Urb. Stud. 225,
257 (2004).

33.

See, e.g., Marla Dresch & Steven M. Sheffrin, Who Pays for
Development Fees and Exactions? 25–28 (1997) (recounting history
and analyzing incidence of exactions).
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The other source of pressure on the traditional model of zoning was
homeowner activism.34 As Fischel has argued, inflation and a rise in
home equity during the 1970s made homeowners ever more concerned
about protecting their homes’ values, which for most was their largest
asset.35 Discretionary-permitting regimes, sometimes coupled with
neighborhood-level review boards, gave homeowners a chance to shape
and customize each potential project in their neighborhood. By fettering
new development with ad hoc conditions and limitations, homeowners
could protect their views, maintain open spaces, ensure architecturalstyle compatibility, and keep poor people out of their communities. All
of this reduced the likelihood of an adverse shock to home values in the
neighborhood.
No device better exemplifies the 1970s’ transformation of land-use
regulation than the “development agreement.”36 This is a contract
whereby a local government agrees to allow certain forms and densities
of development on identified parcels in the future, in return for the
developer providing specified benefits to the city.37
Development agreements positioned local elected officials to
balance their city’s fiscal needs against the demands of neighbors and
interest groups. By zoning for much less housing than market conditions
warranted, or by threatening to downzone specific parcels on which a
project had been proposed, local governments could push developers to
propose a deal. Proposal in hand, officials could take the pulse of
neighbors, and then either quash the project or demand a better deal.

34.

See Fischel, supra note 30, at 205–12.

35.

See id. at 214–15.

36.

See generally David L. Callies et al., Development by Agreement:
A Tool Kit for Land Developers and Local Governments 2–3,
15–36 (2012); Arden H. Rathkopf et al., Rathkopf’s The Law of
Zoning and Planning § 44:1 (Sarah C. Bronin & Dwight H. Merriam
eds., 4th ed. 2019). Development agreements emerged after courts held
that local governments have essentially unlimited discretion to change the
zoning and development regulations applicable to a given site long after
the developer has submitted her project application. For example, the
California Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that developer who had spent
millions of dollars preparing a site and putting in roads and utilities, all
with proper permits, had no vested right to complete her project under
the rules in place at the time she submitted her application. AVCO Cmty.
Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n., 553 P.2d 546, 549–50, 554
(Cal. 1976). The only way the developer could protect herself against
possibly calamitous regulatory changes was to bind the city with a
contract. Though many courts had held that local governments could not
limit their future regulatory power by contract, the California legislature
in 1979 expressly authorized such limitation through development
agreements, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65864–65 (1984), and courts and
legislatures in other states followed suit.

37.

Callies et al., supra note 36, at 15–22.
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Development agreements are but one example of the numerous
devices that local governments utilize as a condition of project approval
to extract resources from developers.38 Broadly speaking, we can
categorize these devices by the medium of exchange (cash versus inkind benefits), and the rigidity of the local government’s demand (a
fixed schedule versus case-by-case negotiation). No public demand is
inexorably fixed, but there is a big difference between legislated
requirements that govern all projects until changed through the
legislative process, and exactions negotiated case-by-case for each
project. Table 1 provides examples in each category.
Table 1. Typology of Value Capture Devices

Fixed Schedule
Money

In-Kind
Benefits

Impact fees (which may finance
roads, sewers, schools, parks,
transportation, public art, or any
other service that the local
government provides, at least in
part, to service the development)
Inclusionary zoning; density-bonus
ordinances; green-building
standards; street-and-sidewalk
improvement requirements; historicfaçade-preservation requirements

Case-by-Case
Negotiation
Development
agreements;
ad
hoc exactions and
site-improvement
requirements;
communitybenefit agreements

Inclusionary zoning and its near cousin, the density-bonus or
“incentive-zoning” ordinance, have emerged as particularly important
examples of the fixed-schedule/in-kind-benefits quadrant.39 Inclusionary
38.

For a comprehensive review, see Selmi, supra note 32, at 597, 602–03.

39.

See David L. Callies & Derek B. Simon, Fair Housing, Discrimination
and Inclusionary Zoning in the United States, 4 J. Int’l & Comp. L. 39,
65–66 (2017); Brian Stromberg & Lisa Sturtevant, What Makes
Inclusionary Zoning Happen? 1–4 (2016), available at http://landuselaw
.wustl.edu/Articles/Inclusionary%20Zoning%20Rept%202016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JC6F-RUT].
All of the recent state-level and citywide upzoning proposals with which
we are familiar have affordable-housing conditions. For example,
California now has a statewide density bonus statute that allows developers
to build a story higher than the applicable zoning (and demand other
concessions) if the developer meets certain affordability targets. See Jon
Goetz & Tom Sakai, MeyersNave, Guide to the California Density
Bonus Law 3, 5, 8 (2020), available at https://www.meyersnave.com/wpcontent/uploads/California-Density-Bonus-Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EPL4-7QZE]. Prominent citywide upzonings in Seattle, Austin, and
Minneapolis all featured affordable-housing conditions. See Daniel
Beekman, Seattle Upzones 27 Neighborhood Hubs, Passes AffordableHousing Requirements, Seattle Times (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:30 PM),

523

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Auctioning the Upzone

zoning requires developers of market-rate projects to set aside a
designated fraction of the units as price-restricted housing for low- or
moderate-income households. Density-bonus ordinances relax other–
wise-applicable density, size, parking, and other restrictions in exchange
for additional price-restricted units.40 Some local governments also use
density bonuses to reward environmentally exceptional projects or
projects with other public benefits.41
B.

“Public Benefit Zoning”: Value Capture Becomes Explicit

Zoning’s transformation into a tool of value extraction was not
without controversy. Early on, a few state courts harshly criticized and
tried to shut down the overt exchange of rezoning for money.42 In 1987,
the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in, holding that the Takings Clause
requires a qualitative “nexus” between any property exaction that a
government demands as a condition of project approval and the
project’s identifiable harms or infrastructure needs.43 A local govern–
ment may not, for example, demand a public right of beach access
through a landowner’s property if the proposed development would
merely impinge on public views, rather than encroach on public rights
of way.44 Soon afterwards, the Court also held that exactions may not
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-upzones-27neighborhood-hubs-passes-affordable-housing-requirements/ [https://
perma.cc/YK2X-NVRY]; Ryan Thornton, Council Passes Affordable
Housing Density Bonus Program, Austin Monitor (May 10, 2019),
https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2019/05/council-passes-affordablehousing-density-bonus-program/ [https://perma.cc/LB9N-HES9]; Amended
and Restated Unified Housing Policy of the City of Minneapolis,
Community Planning & Economic Development (Dec. 7, 2018), http://
www.minneapolismn.gov/cped/housing/cped_affordable_housing_resolution
[https://perma.cc/C479-54ZZ]. A 2017 California statute that streamlines
permits for certain projects in jurisdictions that have failed to meet state
housing goals requires qualifying projects to include a percentage of belowmarket-rate (BMR) units. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65400 (2017). And
the upzoning-near-transit bills recently debated in California and
Washington would similarly have required qualifying projects to satisfy
BMR-share conditions. See supra notes 23–24.
40.

See, e.g., Goetz & Sakai, supra note 39, at 3–6 (summarizing concessions
available under state density-bonus law).

41.

E.g., Seattle, Wash., Municipal Code § 23.41.004 (2020).

42.

See, e.g., Mun. Art Soc’y v. City of New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803–04
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (reversing the city’s sale of site to a developer
because developer was promised a $57 million price reduction if the city
did not provide a zoning bonus); Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars:
New Rules for an Old Game: Comments on the Municipal Art Society
and Nollan Cases, 39 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 12–13, 37
(1991).

43.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).

44.

See id. at 838–39.
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be grossly disproportional in magnitude to the project’s reasonably
foreseeable harms or infrastructure needs.45 The most recent Supreme
Court decision in this lineage extended in-kind exactions’ nexus-andproportionality requirement to monetary fees.46
The economist William Fischel was an early critic of this juris–
prudence.47 He argued that the nexus requirement just made land-use
bargains less efficient. It pushed local governments to barter with
developers, negotiating in-kind exactions when a cash transfer would
have been cheaper for the developer and more valuable to the local
government. The nexus-and-proportionality requirement also made
local governments waste time and money on pointless justificatory
studies, studies that any consultant worth her salt would reverseengineer to reach whatever conclusion about “impacts” served her
client’s interests.
Fischel urged local governments and their judicial and legislative
overseers to abandon the pretense of rational planning in the public
interest. Developers have better information than public officials about
what prospective homeowners and tenants actually want, and about
how to provide those forms of housing at the lowest cost, so developers
rather than planners and politicians should initiate rezonings. To
facilitate rezoning, courts ought to let local governments put whatever
price and other conditions they want on development permits, at least
if the permits would allow developers to build at more than the
“normal” (median) density of developed parcels in the jurisdiction.
Fischel’s plea did not move the federal courts: The nexus
requirement remains the law of the land. Yet the actual practice of
urban land-use regulation today bears more than a passing resemblance
to what Fischel envisioned a generation ago. Sophisticated local
governments make no effort to conceal their value-extraction
ambitions.48 A cottage industry of consultants has sprung into action,

45.

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“We think a term such
as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”) (emphasis added).

46.

Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013).

47.

This paragraph summarizes Fischel’s thinking on the topic in 1985. See
supra note 24, at 75–101. For his latest approach, see Fischel, supra note
30.

48.

For example, many city officials in California said that they opposed the
recent statewide upzoning bills because the bills would deprive cities of
their ability to condition rezoning so as to capture the value conferred by
the rezoning. See, e.g., Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, SF Lawmaker Threatens
to Sue State if Transit-Oriented Development Bill Passes, S.F. Examiner
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/sf-lawmaker-threatensto-sue-state-if-transit-oriented-development-bill-passes/mggallery/image/
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helping local governments that are open to some form of upzoning get
the most buck for their bang49 The consultants’ mantra is simple: “No
densities without amenities.”50 Rezoning for more development should
never occur “until Public Benefit Zoning policies are established.”51 And
what, precisely, is a “public-benefit zoning policy”? To quote a leading
practitioner, it is an “explicit[] attempt[] to recapture land value
increases”52 in the form of impact fees, affordable housing units, land
dedications, and other “community benefits.”53
The linchpin of public-benefit zoning is the “residual land value
analysis.”54 A consultant evaluates development possibilities for parcels
that may be rezoned, estimating total development costs and likely
developer revenues under several rezoning scenarios. The difference (the
residual) is “what the developer can pay for land and still make a
profit.”55 The local government uses the estimated residual to
“determine the level of required community benefits from a new
development, while at the same time maintaining the development’s
financial feasibility.”56 The idea is to set community-benefit demands
at a level that makes development or redevelopment of a parcel just
slightly more profitable than the parcel’s next most remunerative use.
Of course, none of this tracks with the notion that fees and
exactions may only be used to recover costs that a development imposes
on the public. But no matter. More consultants are called into service
to gin up nexus studies premised on every imaginable cost-inflating
assumption.57 Treating those studies’ results as a legally defensible

sf-sb827001/ [https://perma.cc/8J97-V9F4] (reporting on San Francisco
Board of Supervisors’ resolutions to oppose the statewide upzoning bill).
49.

For examples of their handiwork, see, e.g., Dyett & Bhatia, Redwood
City Community Benefits Program, Community Benefits
Program Brief (2014), available at http://www.redwoodcity.org/Home/
ShowDocument?id=4180 [https://perma.cc/GC8U-F954]; Nico Calavita
& Marian Wolfe, White Paper on the Theory, Economics and
Practice of Public Benefit Zoning (2014), available at http://ebho.
org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/LVR-White-Paper-ExecSum_141113
.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/H794-PHMF].

50.

Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at iv.

51.

Id. at ix.

52.

Id. (emphasis added).

53.

Id. at 11–12.

54.

Id. at 5.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Cf. Geoffrey L. Robinson & Christopher A. Chou, Do PostPalmer and Patterson Residential Nexus Studies Satisfy
Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Requirements? (2014)

526

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Auctioning the Upzone

upper bound, the local government then adopts a tiered impact-fee
ordinance, with lower per-housing-unit or per-square-foot fees applied
to parcels where building in the expanded zoning envelope would be
relatively costly compared to the market value of the finished units.58
To illustrate, imagine a neighborhood in which all parcels have
traditionally been zoned for buildings up to forty feet tall. A
contemplated rezoning would allow one-hundred-foot buildings near
two major intersections, fifty-foot buildings along certain corridors, and
otherwise leave the forty-foot cap in place. Concurrent with the
rezoning, the local government enacts a three-tier impact fee, with one
rate set at the level that would recover the estimated residual for
projects that build to one-hundred feet, another rate set to recover the
estimated residual for fifty-foot buildings, and still another to recover
the residual for forty-foot buildings. This is the state of the art today,
exemplified by recent upzonings in San Francisco and Santa Monica.59
If the nexus study does not support a fee schedule that would
recover the full residual, the local government can always supplement
impact fees with other community-benefit demands, such as requiring
developers of high-value sites to set aside more units as affordable
housing, to pay union wages, to install public art, to plant gardens and
street trees, or to do pretty much anything else that the local
government might want. The lower federal and state courts have
facilitated this in various ways, such as by categorizing inclusionary
zoning as an ordinary commercial regulation, exempt from the
heightened scrutiny accorded to property exactions and fees.60
C.

A Critique of Contemporary Value Capture

Though local governments have embraced the “public-benefit
zoning” theory, there remain serious problems with its practice. Cities
today have three basic tools for recapturing upzoning’s value: legislated
schedules of fees, legislated schedules of in-kind benefits, and ad-hoc
exchanges (see Table 1). None of these tools does value capture very
well.
To see the difficulties, consider the best-case scenario: a legislated
impact-fee schedule that is perfectly calibrated to extract the land-value
residual from every parcel, tantamount to a special assessment on
upzoning.61 The fee per square foot of new construction is very high on
(critiquing methods used in nexus studies for affordable-housing impact
fees).
58.

Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at vii–viii.

59.

Id. at 19–29.

60.

See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 978–
79 (Cal. 2015).

61.

States that authorize special assessments typically require them to be used
for recapturing the benefit provided by a specific piece of infrastructure
rather than a change in zoning. There are a few examples from other
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parcels that are large, flat, vacant, and well-located. It is smaller on
parcels that are awkwardly shaped, already in use, and those that would
otherwise be expensive to redevelop. The fee, being perfectly calibrated,
reduces the land-value residual on every parcel to just above zero. Each
parcel that would have been profitable to develop or redevelop absent
the fee is just barely profitable to develop with the fee in place.
Now imagine that the President imposes a tariff on steel, or that
an immigration crackdown dries up the supply of low-wage labor.
Suddenly the cost of construction is much higher than the residualland-value analysis had anticipated, and the actual residual is
negative.62 New development will grind to a halt unless the fees are
reduced.63
For the same reason, a fee schedule calibrated for value capture will
increase the returns to NIMBY activism. Once such a schedule is in
place, any modest, across-the-board increase in the cost of development
will make the land-value residual negative everywhere in the juris–
diction, bringing development to a screeching halt. All it would take is
(say) a ballot measure that either modestly increases the city’s
inclusionary-zoning requirement, imposes a somewhat costly set of
environmental standards, or gives neighbors of proposed projects new
procedural rights that can be used for delay. By contrast, in the absence
of the fee schedule, a ballot initiative that modestly increases develop–
ment costs across the board would kill development only on the hardestto-develop sites. Elsewhere the land-value residual would remain
positive.
Of course, real-world fee schedules are not perfectly calibrated to
extract 99% of the residual on every parcel included in a rezoning. Yet
the imperfections may not make the fee schedule any more conducive
to efficient land use. Under a lumpy, imperfectly calibrated schedule,
the required fee is bound to exceed the land-value residual on some,

countries of special assessments on upzonings. See infra notes 192–195
and accompanying text.
62.

We are using “negative” here a bit loosely, to refer to a residual that is
smaller in expectation than the residual that would be necessary for the
developer to earn a normal, risk-adjusted rate of return.

63.

Cf. J.K. Dineen, SF Residential Projects Languish as Rising Costs Force
Developers to Cash Out, S.F. Chronicle (Aug. 27, 2018), https://
www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-residential-projects-languish-asrising-costs-13183841.php [https://perma.cc/TMV3-WGMP] (reporting that
10% to 15% annual increases in construction costs over five-year period
made many already-entitled residential projects no longer profitable to
build, given fee and exaction schedule, notwithstanding San Francisco’s
sky-high housing prices).

528

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Auctioning the Upzone

perhaps many, sites. Indeed, if neighborhood NIMBYs had a hand in
its development, the fee may have this effect by design.64
No real-world fee schedule is entirely rigid. If a trade shock,
economic downturn, or NIMBY win turns the land-value residual
negative on a big swath of parcels, the city council may revisit and
relax the fees. But negotiations to revise the schedule will be difficult.
Developers, for competitive reasons, will not want to reveal their actual
cost structures. NIMBYs will lobby to keep the fees high, probably
hiding behind a professed concern for affordable housing or the
environment. Other pressing matters may compete for the legislative
body’s time and attention. Time that should be spent debating where
new housing should go will instead be consumed fighting about the level
of the fees.
To do value capture with legislated impact fees is to either embark
on a never-ending, always-contentious project of fee-schedule
adjustment, commit to high fees that end up deterring development on
many sites, or to lowball the fees and leave most of the value conferred
by upzoning uncaptured.
What is the alternative? Well, a city can always do value extraction
using a fixed schedule of in-kind benefits such as affordable-housing
units. But this is even worse. It carries forward the principal vice of
impact fees—the setting of rigid “prices,” which will deter the
development of marginal sites and reward NIMBY activism—while
abandoning the fees’ principal virtue, an efficient medium of exchange.
As Fischel observed long ago, in-kind benefits are generally worth less
than their cash equivalent to local governments.65 This of course raises
the question of why local governments ever choose the in-kind
alternative. One reason is that it allows local governments to end-run
certain legal limitations on the size of fees.66
The remaining mode of value capture is the negotiated, ad hoc deal,
hashed out between the developer and the planning agency or city
council. Fischel rightly emphasized that this mode has certain
advantages, particularly if cash is the medium of exchange.67 Most
significantly, the ad hoc approach reduces demands on planners’
foresight. Developers (who know the market better) make the initial
64.

A high fee may deter redevelopment of smaller parcels with existing homes
(where the land-assembly, demolition, and opportunity cost of redevelopment
would be substantial), while still allowing development on large vacant
sites—which are unlikely to be found in residential neighborhoods.

65.

See supra Part I.C.

66.

See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979
(Cal. 2015) (holding inclusionary zoning to be an ordinary exercise of the
police power, not subject to constitutional limitations on exactions and
fees); see also Part IV.F (exploring the question of whether local
politicians sometimes prefer in-kind exactions).

67.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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proposal about what should be built where, and the government
decisionmaker needs to decide only whether a developer’s cash proposal
is sufficient to pay off the project’s opponents or otherwise make the
project worthwhile. Moreover, because the development price is
negotiated case-by-case, it can be adjusted in response to constructioncost shocks, NIMBY activism, parcel-specific characteristics, or
anything else that affects the land-value residual associated with a given
project at a given time.
Yet as Hills and Schleicher have argued, the case-by-case modality
of rezoning and development permitting has two very significant
downsides.68 First, as a matter of political economy, project-specific
decision-making tends to mobilize nearby homeowners and neigh–
borhood interest groups, who have a lot at stake in each such decision.69
Homeowners and neighborhood groups generally oppose local inten–
sification of land use, so any decision-making procedure that mobilizes
their participation will tend to result in land-use stasis rather than an
increase in density. By contrast, if rezoning is done on a citywide basis,
business and municipal-labor interests—groups that would benefit from
lower housing prices and a bigger tax base—will mobilize. It is not
worth their while to lobby extensively on behalf of individual projects,
because no one project will greatly affect the city-wide tax base or the
regional housing prices.70
Second, while discretionary, project-specific decision-making may
reduce informational burdens on planners, it creates huge informational
costs for developers.71 A developer has to figure out who the relevant
decision-makers are in each neighborhood—not only which public
officials are nominally in charge, but also which interest groups have
clout—and then learn what they want and what their reservation price
is to consent to a rezoning. Interest groups will hold their cards tight
to their vests in the hopes of getting better offers from developers. The
developers who fare best in this game are likely to be local actors with
deep local networks and intimate knowledge of city politics. Yet the
most cost-effective developers are big, publicly traded homebuilders,72
which mass produce single-family housing on exurban, lightly regulated
“greenfields.” In California today, the cost of cookie-cutter greenfield

68.

See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 111–12.

69.

Id. at 112–13.

70.

Id. at 112–15.

71.

Id. at 116–20.

72.

Housing for LA, 25 Solutions From A Builder’s Perspective To Fix The
California Housing Crisis, Urbanize L.A. (Jan. 10, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://urbanize.la/post/25-solutions-builder%E2%80%99s-perspectivefix-california-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/8VHL-FC35] (reporting that
national builders “can construct housing for around 15-to-30 percent
cheaper” than local builders).
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development is roughly one-fifth that of customized infill development.73
Although some of this difference probably reflects reasonable buildingcode requirements and unavoidable site conditions, it is surely the case
that competition, economies of scale, and transaction-cost savings
would reduce the cost of urban infill development if the law created
simple, standardized rights to build simple, standardized apartment
and condo buildings in cities.
The public administrative costs of case-by-case value extraction
should not be overlooked. Santa Monica’s recent experience is ill–
ustrative.74 The city has a long tradition of using ad hoc development
agreements, but local officials decided in the 2000s that they needed to
provide a little more guidance. To this end, the city adopted a general
plan that designates several areas near transit for greater density,
inviting developers to choose among three tiers of additional height and
floor-to-area ratio (“FAR”). Developers that pick Tier 1 get a modest
three- to seven-foot height increase above base zoning in return for
providing affordable housing on site. Those that choose Tier 2 or Tier
3 were allowed more height and FAR in exchange for community
benefits. The original plan provided that if a developer elected Tier 2
or 3, the developer and the city would each prepare a residual-value
analysis for the site. After reconciling their value estimates, the
developer and planning officials were to negotiate a community benefits
package and memorialize the deal in a development agreement ratified
by the city council. It all sounded great in theory, but the city was soon
overwhelmed by the logistics of haggling over dozens of development
agreements.75 The city council ultimately decided to make Tier 2 height
and FAR available in return for a standardized package of pricerestricted units and fees, reserving ad hoc deal-making for larger Tier 3
projects.76
To sum up: value capture is now central to the practice of municipal
land-use regulation, but the available tools to do it have serious
downsides. Legislated-fee and in-kind-benefit schedules are likely to
73.

Jacques Bughin et al., McKinsey Global Inst., A Tool Kit to
Close California’s Housing Gap: 3.5 Million Homes by 2025, at
31 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured
%20Insights/Urbanization/Closing%20Californias%20housing%20gap
/Closing-Californias-housing-gap-Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/8KJ66W54].

74.

See Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 27–29.

75.

See City of Santa Monica, Planning Commission Report 2 (Apr.
3, 2013), https://www.smgov.net/departments/pcd/agendas/planningcommission/2013/20130403/s2013040309b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QRJSYV5] (arguing for administrative “simplicity” over “flexibility” with
respect to Tier 2 projects).

76.

For background, see Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 28–29. For
the current schedule, see Santa Monica, Cal., Zoning Ordinance
§ 9.23.010 (2017).
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deter development of marginal sites while incentivizing NIMBY
activism. The closer the schedule comes to realizing the value-capture
ideal, the more brittle the city’s development regime will become,
vulnerable to external shocks and home-grown NIMBY wins alike. The
ad hoc alternative is more resilient, but it creates enormous inform–
ational costs for developers and administrative costs for cities. Needless
to say, the ad hoc approach is also highly conducive to corruption, a
further drag on the public’s tolerance for development.77

II. The Auction Model
We propose a regime for rezoning with value capture that combines
the informational and administrative advantages of the citywide,
schedule-of-fees modality, with the resiliency of piecemeal negotiated
deals. In fact, we think our approach will prove easier to administer
than a legislated schedule of fees, while also doing a better job than
case-by-case deal-making of accommodating changes in the cost of
development. Relative to the legislated-schedule approach, our model
obviates the need for nexus studies and for updating the schedule in
response to changed conditions. Relative to ad hoc deal-making, our
approach eliminates project-specific research and haggling over what a
particular developer can afford to pay, as well as over how to divide a
developer’s “community benefits” contribution among the many
interest groups that want a piece of it.
Our proposal is to do value capture with auctions. Local
governments would decide which parcels to upzone (consistent with
state policy), while bidders at the auction and participants in the afterauction market would price the right to build in the upzoned area.
Proceeds from the auction would be dedicated to whatever projects or
causes must be funded in order to assemble a political coalition ex ante
for the upzoning.
A.

A Sketch of the Model

Under the model we envision, state legislatures would authorize
local governments that upzone in furtherance of state policy to apply
to a state agency, such as California’s Department of Housing and
Community Development, for permission to auction the newly created
development rights. Winning bidders would acquire tradeable dev–
elopment allowances, roughly analogous to the emissions allowances
that are now bought and sold under California’s cap-and-trade regime

77.

See Michael Manville & Taner Osman, Motivations for Growth Revolts:
Discretion and Pretext as Sources of Development Conflict, 16 City &
Community 66, 76–77 (2017) (arguing, based on case studies, that antigrowth ballot measures are often driven by perceptions of corrupt
relationships between local elected officials and developers).
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for greenhouse gas emissions78 or the transferable quotas used to assign
rights to fisheries.79
A developer applying to build within the expanded zoning envelope
would have to acquire and redeem allowances. The number of
allowances would be determined by the size of her project relative to
the “development baseline.” For example, if the developer could have
built 5,000 square feet under the baseline but the site has been upzoned
for 40,000 square feet, and the developer proposes 38,000 square feet,
the developer would have to redeem allowances for 33,000 square feet.
To protect landowners’ reasonable expectations, the state legis–
lature should carefully bound the development baseline, rather than
leaving it entirely to local governments’ discretion. As Ellickson and
Fischel have argued, landowners should not have to pay for the privilege
of building something similar to what others have already built.80
Longstanding zoning classifications also shape expectations.
Accordingly, we recommend defining the baseline as the greater of: (1)
the number of square feet that could have been built on the parcel
under the zoning map and overlays in effect on the date of the state
statute authorizing the auctions; or (2) the median floor-to-area ratio
(building size divided by lot size) of parcels that had already been
developed for housing within the local government’s territory as of that
date.
The number of allowances created by an upzoning would depend
on the government’s estimate of the total number of buildable square
feet post-upzoning, and the corresponding number under the
development baseline. For example, if a total of 2,000,000 square feet
may be built after rezoning, but only 500,000 square feet could have
been developed under the baseline, allowances for up to 1,500,000
square feet would be auctioned. (Whether these allowances should be
time-limited is an important question.81)
To maximize auction revenues, local governments would delimit
market zones or tiers within which the right to build additional housing
units is of roughly equal value. Development allowances would be
fungible within, but not across, these tiers. A developer who seeks to
build in downtown San Francisco, for example, would have to redeem
“city center” development allowances, rather than the presumably
78.

See Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB Emissions
Trading Program (2015), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KNK-AFD7].

79.

See Anna M. Birkenbach et al., Taking Stock of Catch Shares: Lessons
from the Past and Directions for the Future, 13 Rev. of Envtl. Econ.
& Pol’y 139 (2019).

80.

Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 418–24 (1977); William A. Fischel,
Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995).

81.

See infra Part III.B.
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much cheaper allowances for building in outlying areas. A local
government’s assignment of land parcels to tiers could also account for
existing uses. A parcel with a three-story building that has been
upzoned to allow five stories might be worth redeveloping if housing
prices were very high, but probably only if the price of the necessary
allowances was modest, as the cost of reengineering or tearing down the
existing structure would be substantial.
Assigning parcels to development-allowance tiers will be second
nature for local governments that are already engaged in public-benefit
zoning.82 The underlying logic is the same as assigning upzoned parcels
to impact-fee tiers based on location-specific differences in the private
costs and benefits of development. But a city doing value capture with
auctions need not figure out each parcel’s exact residual. A rough
ordering of parcels by the difference between redevelopment costs and
expected project revenue would suffice.83
Our upzoning-with-auctions model bears a family resemblance to
existing transferable-development-rights (TDR) programs.84 Under a
TDR program, the zoning authority designates separate “sending” and
“receiving” zones, and gives landowners in the sending zone tradeable
development credits, which are usable only by landowners in the
receiving zone.85 Receiving-zone landowners who purchase these chits
are allowed to build in excess of the otherwise-permitted density on
their sites. TDR programs are, in effect, a way to redistribute among
landowners the value created by selective upzoning.86 The auction

82.

See supra Part I.B.

83.

The reason the local government would not need to know the exact
residual is that the allowance market rather than the government would
set the price of the right to build. The reason the local government would
want an approximate ranking of parcels by the residual is that, in a
competitive market, the price of development allowances (like the price of
any other good) will be determined by the marginal buyers and sellers—
those which value the allowances the least. If a significant number of lowresidual sites were included in a mostly high-residual tier, the price of
allowances would fail to reflect the value conferred by upzoning on the
high-residual sites.

84.

See generally Rick Pruetz, Saved by Development: Preserving
Environmental Areas, Farmland and Historic Landmarks with
Transfer of Development Rights 14–17 (1997) (identifying over 100
TDR programs then in effect in the U.S.).

85.

See John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 83 Yale L.J. 75, 86–87 (1973).

86.

See Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 125–27; cf. Vicki Been &
John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: “PostZoning”?, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 435, 464 (2013) (explaining various
measures in recent TDR programs in New York, meant to ensure that the
transferable rights have substantial value).
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model allows that value to be redistributed to the general public, not
just reshuffled among landowners.87
The main differences between our auction proposal and existing
models for public-benefit zoning are, first, the mechanism of value
capture (auctions rather than scheduled or negotiated public benefits);
and, second, the state-approval requirement (most states allow local
governments to enact impact-fee and inclusionary-zoning ordinances
without getting state approval). Why do it with auctions, and why
require state-agency approval? We turn to this next.
B.

Why Auctions?

In contrast to existing mechanisms for value capture, the auction’s
great advantage is that it obtains “public benefits” in their most
generally useful form—i.e., as money, which can be spent on
anything88—while using markets rather than planners to set and
continually adjust the price. The auction model solves the problem of
the mispriced regulatory exaction, one which deters development rather
than extracting value from it.
In contrast to legislated affordable-housing mandates and impactfee schedules, the price of tradeable development allowances would
automatically adjust to a level that allows all otherwise-viable projects
in the upzoned area to proceed. To see the intuition, imagine a site—
say, a commercial warehouse—that has been rezoned for high-density
housing. A developer will pay less for this site under a regime in which
she must also pay for allowances, compared to an otherwise-similar
regime in which she could develop the site without redeeming
allowances. Yet with or without the allowance requirement, competition
among developers trying to purchase sites will raise the price of the site
plus the right to build X square feet on the site to the level at which
developers earn a normal (risk-adjusted) rate of return. The effect of
introducing the development-allowance requirement is just to
redistribute the site-plus-right-to-build price between the site’s owner
and the development allowances’ owners.89
Because the price of allowances on the after-auction market would
constantly adjust as conditions change, the auction method of value
87.

Several of New York City’s recent TDR programs also allow receivingzone landowners to receive extra density or floor-to-area ratio if they make
a cash payment to the city for public benefits. See Been & Infranca, supra
note 86, at 450–55. This is very similar to “auctioning the upzone,” except
that the price of the extra density is set legislatively rather than by
auction.

88.

Though note that this does not mean there could not be a state mandate
to use a set percentage to subsidize housing for poor people. There’s a lot
to be said for such a rule, although it would limit the range of deals that
could be struck locally in order to forge a city-council majority for
upzoning.

89.

This assumes a competitive market for development.
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capture would cushion economic and regulatory shocks. Whereas a fixed
schedule of fees or in-kind benefits would bring development to a halt
if changes in developers’ costs make it infeasible to build (while paying
the fees), the same shock in the auction world would simply reduce
what developers bid for the allowances. Development would proceed
apace, albeit with less money flowing into public coffers.90 The auction
model’s price-adjustment feature also frees up city councils and
planners to focus their energies on forward-looking, big-picture
questions about which areas to upzone, rather than being constantly
diverted by calls to adjust existing fee and public-benefit schedules in
response to supposedly changed conditions.
In addition to the fiscal reward for upzoning, our auction model
would create powerful fiscal incentives for local governments to
streamline and clarify their permitting protocols, design standards, and
the like. If a local government continued to use a highly discretionary
process, the costs of regulatory uncertainty would be borne by the local
government itself in the form of foregone revenue.91 Bidders would not
offer very much money for development allowances that merely license
the owner to haggle with city officials.92 But if the allowances actually
functioned as entitlements to build, they would be enormously valuable
in the high-cost, supply-constrained markets that are increasingly
characteristic of today’s big cities.93
C.

Why State Approval?

For several mutually reinforcing reasons, we recommend
conditioning the local right to auction development allowances on state
approval of the upzoning-with-auctions plan. These reasons include:
90.

In an extreme case, the price could fall all the way to zero. The price of
development allowances on the after-auction market will remain positive
only to the extent that market participants believe the price of a new unit
of housing may exceed the cost of developing it on the most-costly-todevelop sites in the zone. As in any competitive market, prices will be set
by the marginal buyers and sellers.

91.

One study based on a survey of local planners estimates that permitting
times for a typical project are three times as long in heavily regulated
than in lightly regulated communities. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note
10, at 7; see also Housing for LA, supra note 72 (providing pro-forma
examples of how construction delays plus holding costs rapidly erode the
amount that developers will bid for sites).

92.

Brazil has experimented with development rights auctions, and in the
City of San Paolo, the allowances sold at depressed prices during a period
of political uncertainty about whether developers would be able to build
in the upzoned area. See Julie Kim, CePACs and Their Value Capture
Viability in the U.S. for Infrastructure Funding 10–11 (Lincoln Inst. of
Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP18JK1, 2018) (describing effects of
political transition from a mayor who had supported the auctions to a
new mayor who had criticized the auctions during his campaign).

93.

For a ballpark illustration, see infra text accompanying notes 117–131.
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screening local regulatory commitments; discouraging “strategic
downzoning”; answering certain legal objections to the auction model;
and nudging local governments toward welfare-enhancing standard–
ization of property rights.94
1.

Screening Local Regulatory Commitments

The auctioning of development allowances would create a contract
between the local government and the allowances’ purchaser.95 Winning
bidders would convey money to the local government in exchange for
promises about the terms for the development-allowances’ use. To the
extent that these exchanges amount to legally enforceable contracts,96
they can restrict or condition local regulation of land use in the future—
for good or ill.97 A critical function of state administrative review of
auction plans is to filter out bad regulatory commitments while allowing
good ones to take effect.98

94.

If the legislature authorizes local governments to set minimum
“reservation prices” for the auction, state review will also be necessary to
ensure that the reservation price is set at a reasonable level to guard
against market failures (e.g., a shortage of bidders due to some exigency),
rather than at a level which is intended to prevent most of the allowances
from being sold (as NIMBY groups may wish).
It might also be argued that the state-approval step should be used to
check possible overinvestment in housing construction during market
“bubbles.” Yet bubbles are notoriously hard to identify in real time, see
Edward Glaeser et al., A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics,
31 J. Econ. Persp. 93, 106–07 (2017) (showing that answering the
question of whether there is a bubble in Chinese real estate requires
knowledge of the path of future economic growth for decades), and much
mischief could result from a state power to tackle bubbles by restricting
development, rather than with other tools, such as informational remedies
or restrictions on leveraged investments. Given the scale and consequences
of the housing shortage in Northeastern and West Coast metro areas, it
seems delusional to worry about over-building. See Elmendorf, supra note
15 at 86–89.

95.

Cf. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law:
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879 (2011) (examining
various ways in which property and contract law are used by local
governments to entrench land use regulations).

96.

In general, local governments may bind themselves to perform or pay
damages for breaching a contractual regulatory commitment, but the
remedy of specific performance is only available if expressly authorized by
the state legislature. See id. at 892–94.

97.

For an illuminating investigation of the use of private law to entrench
land use regulation, see generally id.

98.

Cf. Serkin, supra note 95, at 933–63 (arguing that regulatory
entrenchment through private law is neither good nor bad per se, but
that, because of the stakes, it should be subject to greater deliberation or
review than regular, non-entrenching public decisions).
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A short-sighted local government (or one that is controlled by
NIMBYs) might auction the development allowances created by a
modest upzone while promising that the local government will never
upzone again, either citywide or in targeted areas. This promise might
make the auctioned allowances more valuable, but only by entrenching
a welfare-reducing, supply-constricting regulatory commitment.
Other regulatory commitments would probably be welfare
enhancing. A local government seeking to increase the value of its
development allowances might bind itself to reforms that curtail neigh–
borhood-gadfly obstructionism, such as by removing certain publichearing requirements, or by limiting neighbors’ rights of internal
appeal.99 If the city’s planning department has a terrible reputation, the
city might even transfer its project review and approval responsibilities
to a state agency, or it might promise to compensate the developer if
the city loses an appeal of a project’s denial. A city could also promise
not to unilaterally change certain rules that apply to the upzoned sites,
while reserving the right to change those rules with the state agency’s
consent. This would create a safety valve to accommodate change if a
genuine need arises, while giving market participants some assurance
that if local NIMBYs win the next election, they will not be able to
shut down new construction and gut the value of extant development
allowances.100
The point of these examples is not to say exactly which regulatory
commitments should or should not be made in connection with a
development-allowance action. It is merely to illustrate a range of
possible commitments, some of which are almost surely welfarereducing—but perhaps tempting for a NIMBY-dominated or fiscally
pressured local government—and others of which are very likely
welfare-enhancing. By conditioning the right to auction development
allowances on state administrative approval, the state can ensure that
99.

Cf. Einstein et al., supra note 12, at 13–14 (documenting severe
overrepresentation of homeowners at public meetings on development
projects); San Francisco General Plan, 2014 Housing Element I.90–
I.91 (2015), https://default.sfplanning.org/plans-and-programs/planning-forthe-city/housing-element/2014HousingElement-AllParts_ADOPTED_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BTP-E75Z] (discussing neighbor-initiated
“discretionary reviews” by Planning Commission as a significant barrier to
development in “high income areas” of the city).

100. Technically, if the mechanism for entrenching the regulatory commitment
is the contract by which development allowances are conveyed to winning
bidders, a local government would probably be allowed to break the
commitment so long as it compensated allowance holders for any
associated reduction in the value of their investment. See Serkin, supra
note 95, at 916–17 (noting that reliance damages are usually the only
remedy for counterparties when a government breaches a contract). For
local regulatory commitments to be specifically enforceable, the state
would have to authorize this in enabling legislation. See infra note 175
and accompanying text.
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local regulatory commitments made in connection with the auctions are
reasonable and aligned with state goals.
2.

A Check on Strategic Downzoning

Another reason for the state-approval requirement is to curtail
strategic downzoning. The concern is that a city with market power
might try to boost auction prices by reducing permissible densities or
building envelopes on non-upzoned sites, or by enacting extremely
cumbersome permitting requirements for projects within the develop–
ment baseline. This concern is not just theoretical: local officials in São
Paulo, Brazil (the one country that has authorized development-rights
auctions) downzoned the entire city before auctioning an upzone in
select locations.101
The risk of strategic downzoning is not unique to our proposal. It
exists whenever cities have an opportunity to extract value via landuse regulation.102 A handbook on density-bonus zoning notes the
importance of reducing the existing base zoning in many cases.103
Taking this message to heart, Culver City, California, cut the base
density of its mixed-use zone roughly in half when it adopted a density
bonus ordinance in 2008.104
A state-approval requirement would not end all abuses, but it
should help to limit them. The state agency could deny approval to
local governments that have downsized their aggregate building
envelope since the auction-authorizing statute took effect, or that
discriminate against projects that do not require development
allowances (for example, by subjecting within-baseline projects to more
onerous review standards or procedures than above-baseline projects).
3.

Answering Legal Objections to “Zoning for Dollars”

There is also a legalistic reason for the state-approval requirement.
We noted earlier that some courts have objected to the explicit
exchange of rezoning for cash, seeing it as corrupting what should be a
101. Hiroaki Suzuki et al., The World Bank, Financing TransitOriented Development with Land Values 218 (2015), available at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/468551468165570019/pdf/
936860PUB00ISB0TransportDevLV0final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX5ZN3G5].
102. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land
Use Litigation, 54 Washburn L.J. 1, 1–3 (2014) (examining the social
costs of regulatory property).
103. See 2 Eric Damian Kelly & Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land
Use Controls § 8.01 (2020), https://advance.lexis.com/document/
?pdmfid=1000516&crid=774a19b1-b5f0-4c57-bcba-f60e7bc2a6b4&Pd
docfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%
3AcontentItem%3A52DD-3F70-R03M-K423-00000-00&pdtocnodeidentifier=
N10FAF&ecomp=yd5dk&prid=9e278ce1-6542-474c-9b55-7a5d3ccaef39.
104. See Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 29.
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rational, public-spirited planning process.105 The state-approval
requirement defangs this objection.
Under our proposal, the state, without a hand in the till, would
choose the criteria that make an upzone in the public interest. A
similarly disinterested state agency would decide whether a particular
proposed upzoning meets those criteria. The criteria could be narrow
and rigid (e.g., “Are the sites to be upzoned located within one-quarter
mile of a transit stop?”), or very broad (e.g., “Are the sites to be
upzoned safe for housing, and located in a region where the price of
housing materially exceeds the usual cost of construction?”).
In a legal challenge, our scheme’s public-profit quality could be
defended not as a way of raising revenue, but as a rational means by
which the state incentivizes local compliance with the state’s housing
and land-use policies.
4.

Standardizing Vertical Property Rights

The final reason for the state-approval requirement is to nudge local
governments toward the welfare-enhancing standardization of property
rights.106 As we explained earlier, one of the principal problems with
case-by-case land-use regulation is that it makes the contours of urban
property rights very difficult for outsiders to discern.107 These
information costs are probably responsible in part for the massive
disparity between the costs of infill and greenfield housing develop–
ment.108
It is possible to accommodate variation in urban character and
preferences within a framework of fairly standardized property rights.
Japan provides a good example. The Japanese government has created
a menu of twelve zoning classifications.109 Local governments have
broad leeway to decide which zones to select from the menu and where
to put them; but local governments have only limited authority to

105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Property Law (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2012) (restating the information-costs theory of
standardization in Anglo-American property law); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (developing nowcanonical theory about property rights and information costs); Hills &
Schleicher, supra note 25, at 135 (critiquing Merrill and Smith for not
addressing contemporary public-law sources of information costs
concerning property rights).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 71–76.
108. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
109. André Sorensen et al., Urban Renaissance as Intensification: Building
Regulation and the Rescaling of Place Governance in Tokyo’s High-Rise
Manshon Boom, 47 Urban Studies 556, 562 (2010).
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supplement the nationally defined zones with custom local overlays.110
Nor can local governments use permitting delays or discretion as
leverage to impose de facto requirements that go beyond the written
standards, because developers may elect to have their projects privately
certified for compliance with the applicable de jure standards.111 It is
probably not a coincidence that, since the 1990s, Tokyo has experienced
a huge expansion of its housing stock with little runup in prices, while
similar “superstar” cities in the U.S. and other industrialized countries
have experienced huge price increases but little housing-stock growth.112
The case for auctioning the upzone certainly does not depend on a
state’s adoption of the Japanese model of land-use regulation, but we
think the auction model (with a state-approval requirement) could
bring about the gradual, voluntary standardization of zoning in
American states. Initially, a state’s housing agency would promulgate
a Japan-like menu of standardized zones and procedures, while letting
local governments decide whether to opt in to menu-based zoning. No
local government would be required to use the menu, but in cases where
an upzoning plan’s approval is a close call (maybe there is some
evidence of strategic downzoning), the state agency could give the
benefit of the doubt to local governments that opt for menu-based
zoning in the upzoned area.
Menu-based upzoning is likely to be especially attractive to smaller
jurisdictions. Other things equal, a smaller jurisdiction will have fewer
resources for crafting and implementing its own customized
arrangements. National developers also have less of an incentive to learn
smaller jurisdictions’ idiosyncratic rules (compared to localities with
numerous high-value parcels), so smaller jurisdictions are likely to
realize much higher prices for their development allowances if they use
110. A landscape preservation law adopted in 2005 allows some local overlays.
See André Sorensen, Evolving Property Rights in Japan: Patterns and
Logics of Change, 48 Urban Studies 471, 486 (2011); Konomi Ikebe, A
Study About the Japanese Landscape Law Including Cultural Landscape and
Historic City Preservation and Restoration Act, 66 HortResearch 1, 2 (2012).
Cities also have some authority to create special use districts. See Anthony
C. Petrillo Jr., Japanese Zoning and Its Applicability in American Cities 36–
37 (Mar. 2017) (unpublished B.S. student project, California Polytechnic
State University), https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1173&context=crpsp [https://perma.cc/8J2S-KQUB].
111. Sorensen et al., supra note 109, at 570.
112. See Daniel Shoag, The Hamilton Project, Removing Barriers to
Accessing High-Productivity Places 13–14 (2019), https://www
.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Shoag_PP_web_20190128.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E477-ZBEN]. To be sure, the reason for this may have as much
or more to do with the national government’s ability to effectively upzone
urban land with subtle administrative changes to the Building Standards
Law, than with cost savings from standardization of urban property
rights. See Sorensen et al., supra note 109, at 565–71 (detailing a series of
changes made from 1987 to 2003 that increased building envelopes within
existing zones).
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menu-based zoning. As more and more small jurisdictions elect to use
the menu, developers will become increasingly familiar with it, and the
value of using the menu will therefore increase for everyone. Eventually
some bigger jurisdictions may start to participate, too. In this way, the
fiscal incentives created by auctioning the upzone could help to bring
about the gradual standardization, within states, of vertical property
rights in American cities.113

III. Auctions and the Political Economy of
Residential Densification
Whether or to what extent our model generates denser residential
land use ultimately depends not on whether auctions are theoretically
more efficient than legislated-schedule or negotiated-deal modes of
value capture, but on how our model affects the political economy of
land-use regulation at local and state levels. Part II touched on some of
the relevant local dynamics. This Part pulls those threads together, and
also considers how the auction model would interact with existing state
frameworks for superintending local regulation.
A.

Auctions in Local Political Context: Facilitating Sticky Upzoning
Deals

It is now widely accepted that neighborhood-level interests—and
particularly but not exclusively homeowners’ interests—are the main
source of political resistance to increased density in residential metro
areas.114 Hills and Schleicher have argued that upzoning is therefore
more likely to occur if zoning changes are enacted through a procedural
framework that knits multiple neighborhoods together into a citywide
deal, rather than by addressing each neighborhood or project in
isolation.115 The prospect of a citywide deal should engage business and
municipal union interests, both of which would benefit from a
substantial increase in the citywide housing supply even though they
have little at stake in any given project. Neighbors, by contrast, tend

113. To be clear, if the zoning menu is state-promulgated, the standardization
is likely to occur within but perhaps not across states. (Japan achieved
national standardizations, but only through a national menu.)
Note that one of us has argued at length that local government finance
would be improved generally if local governments were provided with
state-approved menus of financing tools accompanied by state oversight.
See generally Darien Shanske, The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level
Monitoring of Local Government Finances: Protecting Localities from
Trump’s “Potemkin Villages of Nothing”, 20 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub.
Pol’y 773 (2017).
114. See sources cited in supra note 12.
115. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 111–15.
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to be most engaged by concrete projects and less attentive to
generalized plans.
Our auction model is congruent with Hills and Schleicher’s
“citywide deals” approach, and in fact should make such deals both
easier to assemble initially and harder to unravel later on. First, because
the auction model offers a more efficient mode of value capture than
legislated fees and in-kind benefits, it should generate much more
revenue from upzonining, which local politicians can use to pay off
groups on the margins of the NIMBY coalition and to bring bystanders
into the pro-development coalition.116
The potential surplus is truly enormous. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation for San Francisco makes this clear. On average each year, a
paltry 2500 new housing units are produced in San Francisco.117
Construction costs (at the time of this writing) are very high—about
$350 per square foot—reflecting the city’s byzantine code requirements
and high labor costs.118 Housing in the city sells on average for about
$1150 per square foot.119 San Francisco’s impact and processing fees for
a typical 1000 square-foot apartment or condo come to roughly
$70,000,120 or $70 per square foot. Soft costs—architectural, engineering,
and permitting fees—are commonly estimated at twenty percent of
construction costs.121
116. The upzoning surplus will be especially big if the deal standardizes
property rights by selecting zones from a Japan-style menu and commits
the city to streamlined permitting.
117. S.F. Planning Dep’t, 2018 San Francisco Housing Inventory 6 (2019),
https://commissions.sfplanning.org/cpcpackets/1996.0013CWP_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQY2-ECQR]. The city’s total housing stock is about
400,000 units. Id. at 15. The annual rate of production translates into
about 25,000 units per decade, barely more than 6% of the current stock.
By comparison, economically productive metro regions in the South and
Southwest have increased their (much less expensive) housing supply by
30–60% in barely more than a decade. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note
10, at 19 fig.3.
118. Carolina Reid & Hayley Raetz, Perspectives: Practitioners Weigh
in on Drivers of Rising Housing Construction Costs in San
Francisco 1 (2018), http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/San_
Francisco_Construction_Cost_Brief_-_Terner_Center_January_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QJY4-BV9M].
119. See San Francisco, CA Real Estate Trends, Trulia, https://www.trulia.com/
real_estate/San_Francisco-California/market-trends/ [https://perma.cc/
H8XJ-B3NS] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) (showing that new construction
likely sells for more).
120. San Francisco General Plan, supra note 99, at I.95 tbl.I-62.
121. The Terner Center for Housing Innovation at UC-Berkeley uses this
assumption in its pro-forma calculator. See Housing Development
Dashboard: Development Calculator, U.C.-Berkeley Terner Ctr. for
Housing Innovation, https://ternercenter2.berkeley.edu/proforma/ [https:
//perma.cc/9SXF-UYUL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
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If we further assume that developers must gross about twenty
percent on their investment as compensation for risk, transaction, and
unavoidable holding costs (time from site acquisition to project
completion under a speedy permitting regime),122 the potential
“uncollected” land value residual on a typical 1000 square foot condo
in San Francisco is about $430 per square foot.123 At the current
production rate of 2500 units per year, that is roughly $1.075 billion
each year—a sum approximately half the amount of the city’s
discretionary general fund,124 and twice the transit agency’s capital
budget.125
Of course, many of those 2500 units come from projects within the
“development baseline,” and so the corresponding development rights
could not be auctioned.126 By upzoning, however, the city could create
a lot of new buildable space above the baseline.127 Assume that the city,
responding to fiscal incentives, upzones and triples the rate of housing

122. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10, at 8 (estimating that the typical
developer, nationally, requires a 17% return on land and construction
costs).
123. 0.8*$1150 - 1.2*$350 - 70 = $430.
124. S.F. MTA Board Approves $1.2B Two-Year Operating Budget, Metro
Mag. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.metro-magazine.com/managementoperations/news/729254/san-francisco-mta-board-approves-1-2b-two-yearoperating-budget [https://perma.cc/F4WM-KGJS] (reporting capital budget
of $513.5 million for FY19 and $630.8 million for fiscal year 2020).
125. Dominic Fracassa, SF’s Budget Soars by $937 Million and Will Top $11
Billion for First Time, S.F. Chronicle (May 31, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-s-budget-soars-by-937million-and-will-top-12955416.php [https://perma.cc/PE56-WKVJ]
(explaining that most of the city’s budget is controlled by enterprise
agencies and set-asides, leaving $2.2 billion to the city council’s
discretion).
126. This is factually incorrect; most projects in the city require a
rezoning or other regulatory exemption. See Mac Taylor,
Legis. Analyst’s Off., Do Communities Adequately Plan for
Housing? 8–9 (2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3605/plan-forhousing-030817.pdf [https://perma.cc/775D-TPUL].
127. Hunter Oatman-Stanford, The Bad Design that Created One of America’s
Worst Housing Crises, Fast Company (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.
fastcompany.com/90242388/the-bad-design-that-created-one-of-americasworst-housing-crises [https://perma.cc/93AY-LEB6]. In 1978, the city
was drastically downzoned. The 1978 reforms established 40’ height limits
in most of the city, eliminating an estimated 180,000 potential units of
new housing. Id. Today the city’s density is about one-third that of
Paris’s. See Adam Brinklow, Mapping What SF Would Be Like if it Were
as Dense as New York, Paris, and Manila, Curbed: S.F. (Mar. 8, 2017,
2:48 PM), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/3/8/14856316/san-francisco-densitymap [https://perma.cc/XAG8-SM62].
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production, yielding a still-modest 7500 new units annually.128 The
potential auction revenue from the additional 5000 units—$2.15 billion
annually—would double the city’s discretionary general fund.
These numbers should be taken with several grains of salt. If San
Francisco auctioned development allowances while leaving the rest of
its regulatory apparatus as-is, we do not think developers would bid up
the price of allowances to anywhere near the $430 per square foot on
which our eye-popping calculations rest.129 Developers must also
account for any in-kind contributions or fees the city demands of them
(site improvements, affordable housing, etc.), as well as the city’s
notoriously lengthy and unpredictable permitting process.130 But that’s
precisely the point: if the city could auction development allowances, it
would then face the opportunity cost of its discretionary permitting
process, and it would have a strong fiscal incentive to eliminate in-kind
requirements that generate less value for the city than they cost
developers. The city would also bear the cost of its many idiosyncratic
building-code amendments, which have pushed construction costs in
the city far above the national average for similar buildings.131
128. 7,500 units per year translates into a per-decade housing supply increase
of about 19%, roughly half of what affordable and economically productive
regions manage to produce. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10, at 19
fig.3.
129. See N.Y.U. Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urb. Pol’y, supra note
23, at 9–10. Researchers in New York City have documented wide
variability in the per-square-foot price reflected in TDR transactions,
ranging from well under $100 to nearly $500 per square foot. Id. at 9.
Some of this variability may be due to the thinness of the market, and
the lack of readily available information about the price of transfers. See
id. at 13 (reporting that the developer of one project in 2008 bought rights
from several sellers at prices ranging from $248 to $435 per square foot).
130. Julie Littman, It May Take a Recession to Solve San Francisco’s
Permitting Backlog, Bisnow (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/
san-francisco/news/construction-development/san-francisco-real-estatebusiness-and-politics-87757 [https://perma.cc/TX8R-AM3V]. Developers
might also refrain from bidding up allowances to the full $430 per square
foot because they expect housing supply to increase regionally and prices
to come down, in response to the auction incentive, or because they expect
allowances to be used in some future year and discount their bids
accordingly. See Vicki Been et al., The Market for TDRs in New York
City 29 (Nov. 1, 2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
131. Reid & Raetz, supra note 118, at 2. In 2017, the national average
construction cost for an eight- to twenty-four-story building was about
$230 per square foot, see Fannie Mae, Multifamily Market
Commentary—March 2017, at 1 (2017), available at https://www
.fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/emma/pdf/MF_Market_Commen
tary_031517.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJX6-84ZL], which is one-third less
than San Francisco’s $350-per-square-foot average for all construction
types, see Reid & Raetz, supra note 118, at 1. If San Francisco could
simplify its building code enough to bridge even half of the gap (i.e.,
bringing costs down by $60 per square foot), that alone would be worth
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The bottom line is that for high-cost, supply-constrained cities, the
right to auction development allowances would not be a case of fiscal
tinkering on the margins. The potential financial payoff from upzoning,
permit streamlining, and building-code reform could be massive, and
there would be myriad opportunities for ambitious politicians to create
or expand pro-development political coalitions. In one city, tax refunds
for homeowners might cinch the upzoning deal;132 in another, it might
be pristine new parks and schools, or a world-class subway system. This
is for the politicians to figure out. And there is every reason to think
they would figure it out, for local governments have proven quite
responsive to fiscal incentives in the past.133 The adoption of flexible
zoning is one example; another is zoning for commercial development
in pursuit of sales tax revenue.134
To be sure, there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity in highcost jurisdictions’ responses to this new fiscal incentive. Rich,
homogeneous suburbs in which nearly every voter is a homeowner—
nay, a white homeowner—may remain largely unmoved. Racial
animosities and fears undoubtedly play a central role in suburban landuse regulation.135 But there is plenty of variation across municipalities
$150 million annually, or $450 million if the city tripled the rate of housing
production.
132. Cf. William A. Fischel, Commentary, Recalibrating Local Politics to
Increase the Supply of Housing, 42 Reg. 38, 44–45 (2019) (suggesting, in
response to Elmendorf, that some of the upzone-auctioning proceeds
should be used to pay off incumbent homeowners); David Schleicher, City
Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1725–32 (2013) (suggesting taxincrement financing with payoffs to existing homeowners).
133. The state could also facilitate these deals by making local fiscal
commitments undertaken in connection with a state-approved auction
plan enforceable as state law. See infra Part IV.E.
134. See Karen Chapple, The Fiscal Trade-off: Sprawl, the Conversion of
Land, and Wage Decline in California’s Metropolitan Regions, 177
Landscape & Urb. Plan. 294, 298 (2018); Robert W. Wassmer,
Fiscalisation of Land Use, Urban Growth Boundaries and Non-Central
Retail Sprawl in the Western United States, 39 Urb. Stud. 1307, 1324
(2002); Paul G. Lewis, Retail Politics: Local Sales Taxes and the
Fiscalization of Land Use, 15 Econ. Dev. Q. 21, 31 (2001). This is not to
say that local governments are budget maximizers. Cf. Daryl Levinson,
Empire Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
915 (2004) (critiquing arguments that rest on this assumption). Politicians
are directly responsive to political incentives, not financial incentives. Our
point is simply that that auction model would make upzoning more
politically attractive by giving local officials a more efficient way to tap
and distribute the potential surplus from upzoning.
135. See, e.g., Jessica Trounstine, Segregation by Design: Local
Politics and Inequality in American Cities 30 (2018); Camille
Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29
Ann. Rev. Soc. 167, 191 (2003) (“The overall conclusion to be drawn is
that active racial prejudice is a critical component of preferences for
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in the relative proportions of homeowners versus renters, whites versus
nonwhites, residents of multifamily buildings versus residents of singlefamily homes, and Democrats versus Republicans—all of which are
associated with different land-use preferences.136 Obviously, in many
jurisdictions, there is also significant neighborhood-to-neighborhood
variation in these proportions.137 So while the fiscal incentive to
“auction the upzone” is unlikely to generate pro-development coalitions
everywhere, politicians will likely manage to assemble such coalitions
in many cities, at least for the purpose of upzoning certain
neighborhoods or collections of neighborhoods.
As these coalitions come together, our auction framework will help
them to forge more durable upzoning deals than are possible today,
deals that local anti-development factions would have difficulty
unwinding. The deals will be more durable de facto because—in
contrast to legislated-fee schedules for value extraction—the market’s
pricing of the development allowances will act as a shock absorber on
NIMBY activism. We saw in Part II that a fee schedule that universally
drives the land-value residual down to nearly zero would powerfully
motivate NIMBY groups to invest in virtually any potential regulation
that promises to even somewhat increase the cost or risks of
development. By contrast, under the auction model of value capture,
modest NIMBY triumphs would be quickly capitalized into the afterauction price of development allowances and bids at future auctions.
Development projects would still be profitable for developers unless the
NIMBY measure is so extreme as to drive allowance prices to zero.
Our framework also supports durable upzoning deals by authorizing
city councils to enact zoning and permitting reforms that, with the
state’s approval, will bind future city councils. The model induces an
asymmetry in the stickiness of municipal policymaking: when the city
council is controlled by factions whose land-use preferences align with
the state agency’s, the council will be able to enact entrenched, hardto-change zoning and permitting reforms. But when factions opposed
to the state’s housing agenda control the city council, they will be able
to enact only ordinary, non-entrenched ordinances. This asymmetry
cuts in favor of housing development to the extent that the state agency
has more consistent pro-housing and pro-density preferences than most
city councils. On balance this is likely to be the case, particularly if the
integration, and therefore, the persistence of racially segregated
communities.”).
136. See, e.g., Mummolo & Nall, supra note 1, at 52 (presenting evidence of
land-use preferences across different groups); Hankinson, supra note 12,
at 473–74; Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 139–40 (arguing that geographic
variation in preferences for new housing is one of the key stylized facts to
which policy should respond).
137. This is in part a legacy of racist policies such as redlining. See
Trounstine, supra note 135, at 32.
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state agency is controlled by the governor.138 The governor, responsive
to a statewide electorate, is less likely to cater to a specific
neighborhood’s interests than is a city council whose members answer
to small territorial districts.139
To be sure, there are other ways for states to enable local prohousing factions to make binding upzoning and permit-streamlining
commitments without auctioning development rights.140 The auction
model is nonetheless useful for this purpose, both because it provides a
convenient mechanism for effectuating the commitment (a contract
between the local government and development-allowance purchasers)
and because development-allowance auctions would make local govern–
ments confront the opportunity cost (in foregone auction revenue) of
not committing to a quick, predictable process for processing develop–
ment applications on the upzoned sites.
B.

Auctions in Statewide Political Context: Ameliorating Informational
Asymmetries

So far we have presented our model as a fiscal inducement for local
governments to allow greater density in accordance with state policy.
The model increases the size of “pie” that can be split through an
upzoning deal, and it creates a policymaking asymmetry such that local
YIMBY factions can more easily entrench their land-use preferences.
But there is another benefit as well for states, such as California, that
require local governments to periodically plan for needed housing and
submit those plans for state review.141
138. See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 143–44 (listing structural reasons why
governors are likely to be more pro-housing on average than state
legislators or local officials).
139. Recent empirical studies find that cities that switch from at-large to
districted elections become much less accommodative of development. See
Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, How Electoral Institutions Shape
the Efficiency and Equity of Distributive Policy (Sept. 17, 2019),
http://mhankinson.com/assets/hankinson_magazinnik.pdf (finding that
plausibly exogenous shifts from at-large to districted local elections induced
by California Voting Rights Act caused 46% decline in multifamily housing
production); Evan Mast, Why Do NIMBYs Win? Local Control and Housing
Supply (Dec. 2019), https://www.dropbox.com/s/76jq4x0x2yc2c54/mast_
at_large_ward.pdf?dl=0 (finding similar effect from shifts induced by
national Voting Rights Act).
140. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 129 (suggesting revisions to the
“West Coast” model for periodically reviewing local land-use plans, which
would enable local pro-housing factions to entrench liberal land-use
regimes).
141. Many of the nation’s high-cost housing markets are located in such states.
See generally id. at 94–95 (explaining that the West Coast states all
require periodic planning subject to state review, and that Massachusetts
and New Jersey have also created strong incentives for local governments
to submit affordable-housing plans for state review).
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State agencies trying to gauge the adequacy of local housing plans
operate at an enormous informational disadvantage relative to local
governments. The informational problem arises because local govern–
ments may comply with state requirements to zone for certain amounts
and types of housing while maneuvering to make that housing nearly
impossible to build. For example, if the state tells a local government
to zone for 10,000 new housing units at a density of at least thirty units
per acre,142 the local government could selectively upzone parcels that
are small, steep, contaminated, lacking infrastructure, or occupied by
existing uses that make redevelopment unlikely. Or the local
government make fees and exactions prohibitively expensive. Or it
could make the projects economically infeasible by subjecting them to
costly parking and site-improvement requirements, or idiosyncratic
building standards. Or it could enact setback requirements, or height
and open-space “overlays,” which reduce the effective building envelope
on actual lots to a size that cannot accommodate anything like the
nominally-allowed density. Or it could impose discretionary design
standards and procedures for internal appeals so that project opponents
can drag out the permitting process for years, killing development with
holding costs.
States can, and do, try to monitor all of this,143 but it is a Sisyphean
task, made all the more difficult by the fact that many of the tools in
the local regulatory toolbox can be used for socially beneficial purposes
(maximization of the joint value of nearby properties), neutral purposes
(capture and redistribution of value), or deleterious purposes (killing
economically efficient projects). For example, any given inclusionary
zoning ordinance could be either a reasonable effort to extract locational
value and convert it into subsidized housing, a bludgeon designed to
142. California and New Jersey effectively require local governments to plan
for affordable housing by zoning at certain minimum densities. See Cal.
Gov’t Code § 65583.2 (2011); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6
A.3d 445, 461–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (invalidating regulation
which, in the court’s view, would have allowed local governments to comply
with their affordable-housing obligations by zoning land at insufficient
density and with excessive BMR requirements), aff’d as modified sub nom.
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 74 A.3d 893 (N.J. 2013). For large cities,
thirty units per acre is the presumptive minimum density under California
law for lower-income housing sites. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65583.2
(2011).
143. In California, the housing element of each local government’s general plan
must include an analysis of constraints to the “development of housing
for all income levels,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 65583(a)(5)–(6) (2011), and a
“schedule of actions” to “[a]ddress and, where appropriate and legally
possible, remove constraints,” id. § 65583(c). The state agency charged
with periodically reviewing and certifying housing elements has issued
detailed guidelines about this analysis and program. See Building Blocks,
Cal. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., http://www.hcd.ca.gov/communitydevelopment/building-blocks/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/G3DB-988B]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2020).
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kill market-rate development by making it prohibitively expensive
citywide, or a subtly devious device to eliminate market-rate develop–
ment in most neighborhoods even as development remains profitable on
a handful of large, vacant sites in prime locations. It is not enough for
the state oversight agency to know that a local government has an
inclusionary requirement; the agency must figure out how it actually
works, in combination with all the other local requirements. The same
can be said for most any other component of the local government’s
development-regulation regime.
The informational problem comes into stark relief if one peruses a
few of the “housing elements” that California requires local govern–
ments to submit periodically for state review and approval. A housing
element must include an inventory of developable sites and an analysis
showing that those sites can accommodate the local government’s share
of “regional housing need” for the planning cycle.144 Local governments
and the state housing agency both understand that the official zoning
classification of a site may badly overstate the site’s actual development
potential. The housing element must therefore include an assessment of
each site’s “realistic” capacity.145 Some housing elements use simple
rules of thumb, such as assuming that eighty-five percent of zoned
capacity is realistic for inventory sites if recently approved projects have
realized about eighty-five percent of nominal capacity.146 Other housing
elements use complicated algorithms, embedding questionable assump–
tions in pages of computer code.147 Still others purport to rely on what
developers said about the capacity of identified sites.148 (How is the
state agency supposed to judge the credibility of developers whom the
local government selected to interview?) Needless to say, the amount
of new housing actually permitted by California’s local governments

144. See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 105.
145. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65883.2(c) (2011).
146. See, e.g., City of San Diego, General Plan: Housing Element
2013–2020, at HE-17 (2013), available at https://www.sandiego.gov/
sites/default/files/legacy/planning/genplan/heu/pdf/housingelementfull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U4M-Y5Z6]. This is a dubious rule of thumb, because
the sites on which development is observed to occur may be much easier
to develop at 85% of zoned capacity than is the typical site in the site
inventory. The hard-to-develop sites may not be developed at all.
147. See, e.g., San Francisco General Plan, supra note 99, at app. D
(detailing assumptions by zoning district, while doing nothing to verify with
housing-outcomes data whether parcels with the stated characteristics are
actually likely to be developed at the stated densities over the eight-year
planning cycle).
148. See, e.g., City of Redwood City, General Plan app. B (2014),
available at https://www.redwoodcity.org/home/showdocument?id=7144
[https://perma.cc/YM3D-2HQS].
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pales in comparison to the ostensible site capacities claimed in the
housing elements.149
Now imagine that each of California’s local governments, at the
beginning of the planning cycle, auctioned development allowances
equal to their housing element’s claimed capacity. Imagine also that the
development allowances were time-limited, expiring at the end of the
cycle. If a housing element greatly overstated the inventory sites’
aggregate capacity, then the price of the corresponding development
allowances would be very low, as the marginal development allowance
in such a jurisdiction would almost never be used.
The investors who purchase development allowances would also
have a strong incentive to ferret out the most problematic constraints
and relay this information to state regulators. If they can get the
problematic constraints removed, they value of their developmentallowance holdings would rise. To be sure, the owners of site-inventory
parcels have similar incentives today, but the arbitrage strategy of
buying sites in hard-to-develop jurisdictions and then lobbying the state
agency to push the local government to remove constraints comes with
higher transaction costs. Compared to the market in land, the develop–
ment-allowance market should be more liquid, standardized, and
transparent. Land parcels differ from one another in many ways that
affect value: size, location, soils, existing uses, possible contamination,
and so forth. Development allowances, by contrast, would be perfectly
fungible within market tiers. Each allowance would entitle its owner to
exactly the same thing: the opportunity to build a given number of
square feet, within the new zoning envelope and above the development
baseline, on any parcel within a defined area.
The hypothetical we have sketched is somewhat unrealistic because
California probably could not require local governments to auction all
of their claimed development capacity.150 But this thought experiment
nonetheless illustrates a number of important points.
First, any time a local government purports to upzone, the actual
amount of practically buildable capacity will be a mystery to anyone
who lacks detailed, insider knowledge about how the zoning map
interacts with site conditions and all of the other local requirements
and development-permitting procedures. Investors in the developmentallowance market would have an economic incentive to figure this out,
and to the extent that they remain uncertain, they will discount their
149. Monkkonen & Friedman, supra note 20, at 2.
150. Some of those capacities are likely to be within the development baseline.
There are also probably constitutional as well as prudential limitations on
how low the development baseline could be. A court might find a taking
if the local government required parcel owners to purchase development
allowances in order to make any residential use of their property. Further,
as a matter of market design, it may be better not to auction all of the
allowances at once. See infra Part IV.A.
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bids accordingly. Because cities will want to get high prices for their
development allowances, they will try not to auction more develop–
ment-allowance square footage within a zone than actually exists. By
monitoring the amount of auctioned capacity in each jurisdiction, and
the price at which the allowances trade relative to the price of finished
housing in the jurisdiction,151 the state can get a decent how much
above-baseline capacity in a zone or tier actually exists.152 This is a
much easier task for a lightly staffed state agency than figuring out how
the mass of land-use regulations in each local jurisdiction interact to
yield practical development capacity—or lack thereof.
Second, to the extent that state courts or agencies have the
authority to make local governments remove constraints, the develop–
ment-allowance market’s existence should improve the flow of
information to state regulators about particularly severe constraints.
Arbitrageurs who specialize in identifying removable constraints and
relaying this information to the state agency will scour the practices of
jurisdictions whose development allowances are inexpensive relative to
the price of housing. If they find removable constraints, they will buy
up those allowances, notify the agency, and sell the allowances at a
profit once the agency cracks down on the local government.
Third, the existence of a local right to auction the developable space
created by upzoning should make it easier for the state agency to
identify bad-actor local governments, those that are using the tools of
public-benefit zoning to kill development rather than to extract value
from it. Local governments that mean to extract value would opt in to
the auction regime; whereas those that intend to thwart development
would have little reason to participate. If bad-actor local governments
were to participate, it would be easy enough for the state agency to see
through their pretenses, since they would either elect to auction only a
very small amount of their nominal development capacity, or their
allowances’ price would be very low, reflecting the market’s belief that
that jurisdiction’s marginal allowances will never be used.
One last point. It is common for local governments to defend
barriers to housing development by appealing to convention and peer151. To restate this point more precisely: the agency would want to monitor
the gap between development allowance price and the counterfactual land
value residual that would be realized if the local government did not
inflate construction costs with unnecessary code and labor requirements.
Monitoring the gap between housing prices and allowance prices should
be a pretty good proxy, because the costs of building materials and labor
does not vary greatly from one jurisdiction to the next. On interjurisdictional
construction-cost variation, see Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10;
Romem, supra note 10.
152. To be sure, the reason for the lack of “practical capacity” may not be
excessively stringent local land use controls. Maybe the problem is
excessively small parcels, or valuable existing uses on many parcels, or
contaminated soils, or some other hazard that precludes redevelopment.
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jurisdiction practice.153 Under the auction regime, local governments
would have a meaningful fiscal incentive to figure out whether local
requirements that raise development costs and generate permitting
delays also reasonably advance an important public purpose. Some
practices that are now conventional, such as discretionary design review
of mid-size projects that comply with the zoning code’s objective
requirements, would probably be abandoned.154 As the auction-part–
icipating jurisdictions remove these requirements, other jurisdictions
could no longer defend them as conventional. By observing patterns of
local regulatory reform in the auction-participating jurisdictions, the
state housing agency could ascertain which local requirements and
procedures are reasonable methods for coordinating land use, and which
are just levers for obstructionists.

IV. Objections
There are, of course, a range of possible objections to our proposal.
This Part addresses those that we consider most significant.
A.

Allowance Owners as an Antidevelopment Interest Group?

Our local-political-economy analysis emphasized the opportunities
that auctions would provide for city officials to convert latent
“developable value” into pro-development political coalitions and major
upzonings.155 Our state-level discussion highlighted ways in which
allowance prices and allowance owners could help state regulators
identify local barriers to development.156 But a darker possibility should
153. See, e.g., City of Redwood City, General Plan, supra note 148, at
H-84 (“A survey of neighboring jurisdictions (East Palo Alto, Belmont,
and San Carlos) indicates that permit fees in Redwood City are very
similar to those found in neighboring San Carlos and Belmont and slightly
less than those in East Palo Alto.”); City of Pasadena, Housing
Element 2014–2021, at B-18 (2014) (stating that city’s dedication
requirements for new subdivisions “are similar to jurisdictions across
southern California and are not deemed to place a unique cost or actual
constraints upon the development, improvement, and maintenance of
housing”), available at https://ww5.cityofpasadena.net/planning/wpcontent/uploads/sites/56/2017/07/Adopted-Housing-Element-2014-0204.pdf [https://perma.cc/7377-M325]; City of Mountain View, 2015–
2023 Housing Element 106–10 (2014) (justifying Mountain View’s
inclusionary-zoning, park-dedication, and impact fees with reference to
those in nearby cities), available at https://www.mountainview.gov/
civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=15284 [https://perma.cc/C8VPVXRV].
154. Cf. O’Neill et al., supra note 28, at 49–50 (finding, in study of San
Francisco Bay Area cities, that every housing project of five or more units
was subject to discretionary, design-oriented review).
155. See supra Part III.A.
156. See supra Part III.B.
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also be considered. Might the holders of extant development allowances
eventually coalesce as a powerful new interest group opposed to future
upzonings and development-allowance auctions?157
Consider taxi medallions. Professor Katrina Wyman’s study of New
York City’s canonical medallion regime shows that the regime was not
created in response to intense lobbying pressure from taxi companies.158
Medallions were not scarce initially. But as the city’s population and
economy grew, medallion prices went up, and medallion owners become
forceful opponents of expanding the medallion supply.159 Mayors
responded to the fiscal incentive to auction more allowances, but their
liberalizing forays were mostly beaten back by lobbyists for the
incumbent medallion owners.160 This story is not unique to New York.
Medallion-style taxi regimes are common elsewhere, and they are
generally thought to result in an inefficient shortage of taxi services.161
It was Uber and Lyft, not cities acting on a fiscal incentive to auction
more medallions, that finally broke the taxi cartels.162
Development allowances under our model would be a type of
regulatory property akin to taxi medallions, although, importantly,
they would lack some of the characteristics that made medallions so
conducive to the formation of a supply-restricting cartel. Whereas taximedallion owners had homogeneous interests with respect to the supply
of new medallions—restrictions raised all of the owners’ incomes and
asset values—the owners of development allowances would have con–
flicting interests. Builders and developers seeking to secure projects
would surely be major players in the development-allowance market,
and their interests would be at war with buy-and-hold investors’.163
157. In New York City, the owner of the TDRs that were issued as part of the
historic preservation deal unsuccessfully opposed an upzoning of parcels
in the “receiving zone,” and subsequently brought a taking claim against
the upzoning, which the city settled (reportedly for a nominal sum). See
Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev.
913, 914 (2016).
158. Katrina Mariam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New
York Taxicab Medallions, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 125, 168–69 (2013).
159. Id. at 173–77 (documenting the role of incumbent taxi medallion holders
in blocking mayoral plans to auction additional medallions).
160. Id. at 177–85.
161. See id. at 147 n.121 and sources cited therein.
162. See generally Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2017). To be sure, there were various
earlier efforts in some cities—some successful—to reduce entry barriers to
taxi markets through regulatory reform. See Wyman, supra note 158, at
147 n.121 and sources cited therein.
163. In the taxi context, only consumers’ interests were opposed to the medallion
owners’, and consumers were not well organized and did not have
incentives to organize. See Wyman, supra note 158, at 156–63.
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Also, whereas taxi medallions were often owned by long-term
players who built deep relationships with each other and elected
officials,164 the development allowance market would be more in flux.
Development allowances, unlike taxi medallions, would produce income
only when sold or redeemed, and the “interest group” consisting of a
given upzoned area’s allowance owners would actually be selfliquidating over time, as development occurs and the associated allow–
ances are redeemed.165
It was easy for big taxi-medallion investors to put a sympathetic
face on their lobbying efforts, arguing that issuing new allowances
would wreck the small independent drivers whose livelihoods depend on
their medallions.166 But no workers’ livelihoods would depend on
restricting future upzonings. And whereas cities wielded monopoly
power over their taxi markets, housing markets are regional; housing in
one city is a (perhaps imperfect) substitute for housing in a neighboring
city.
And yet, none of these distinctions vitiate the basic point that
restrictions on future upzonings in a region would likely raise the value
of existing, long-term development allowances, benefiting those
allowances’ investors-owners. Some investors might form unholy
alliances with existing NIMBY groups. (On the other hand, the owners
of upzoned, still-developable parcels of land may have less reason to
lobby against future upzonings elsewhere in the city or region because
much of their land’s development value would have been transferred to
allowance holders.167)

164. See Wyman, supra note 158, at 156–57, 163–64, 174–77 (discussing “large
fleet owners whose families have owned medallions since the late 1930s
and 1940s,” organizational costs, and lobbying efforts).
165. This turnover would make it harder for the owners to organize as a potent
political force.
166. Cf. Brian M. Rosenthal, As Thousands of Taxi Drivers Were Trapped in
Loans, Top Officials Counted the Money, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/nyregion/taxi-medallions.html
[https://perma.cc/8C9F-CLZR] (painting sympathetic portrait of independent
taxi drivers trapped by debt); Brian M. Rosenthal, Facing Ruin, Taxi
Drivers to Get $10 Million Break and Loan Safeguards, N.Y. Times (June
12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/nyc-taximedallions.html [https://perma.cc/JAK7-QEHT] (reporting on city initiatives
to bail out drivers in debt).
167. The extent to which this is so depends on: (1) the extent to which, under
the status quo, land value residuals are captured and/or destroyed by
exactions, fees, and permitting regulations; and (2) the extent to which,
under the auction regime, the allowances capture the full residual.
(Because allowance prices would be determined by marginal buyers and
sellers, the market price of allowances for a zone or tier would not capture
the full residual for non-marginal parcels in the tier, i.e., those that are
more valuable to develop / redevelop than the marginal parcels.)
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In any event, there are various ex ante ways for the auction
framework’s designers to mitigate the risk of development-allowance
owners eventually becoming a potent anti-upzoning force. For example,
the state could set limits on the concentration of allowance holdings,
particularly holdings by investors who are not themselves developers,
builders, or owners of parcels in the upzoned area.168 Or, more
decisively, the state could put strict time limits on the development
allowances, akin to the several-year fuse that cities often put on the
entitlements for housing projects.169 If allowances had short lifespans,
developers and builders with ready-to-go projects would dominate the
market for allowances, rather than investors who bet on long-term price
trends connected to the zoning envelope’s future expansion—or lack
thereof.
But there are tradeoffs to consider, too. Most notably, short-term
allowances would probably be less effective for entrenching, and
rewarding, big upzoning deals. To illustrate, imagine an upzoning that
removes density limits and increases allowable heights and floor-to-area
ratios by fifty percent in existing residential neighborhoods throughout
a large city. If the city auctioned the newly developable square footage
all at once, and if the development allowances had, say, a three-year
fuse, the allowances would probably sell for about $0. Allowance prices
would be extremely low even if it were very profitable to buy up existing
homes at fair market value and replace them with larger multi-family
structures. The reason is that many homeowners across the city would
not want to sell to a developer within the next three years, even at fair
market value; and in any event, the building industry would probably
lack the capacity to rebuild all of the city’s residential neighborhoods
in just three years.170 The marginal development allowance in this
scenario would therefore be worthless, and because prices in competitive
markets are set by the marginal buyers and sellers, development
allowances would trade for almost nothing.
By contrast, if the same amount of developable space were
auctioned in the form of perpetual-development allowances, the city
would probably collect a tidy sum. In the perpetual-allowance world,

168. The goal here is to keep buy-and-hold investors from becoming the
dominant players in the market.
169. For a summary of the entitlement periods in Los Angeles, see Fernando
Villa & Shelby Q. McMahon, Los Angeles Enacts Ordinance to Streamline
Entitlement Process, Pircher, Nichols, & Meeks LLP (June 5, 2012),
https://www.pircher.com/insights-publications-94.html [https://perma
.cc/V2PM-6U5L].
170. Note that staggered allowance auctions also mitigate this problem, but
that the volume of allowances might still not be sufficient for large projects.
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bids at the auction would reflect the present value of development far
into the future.171
To profit from big upzonings in a world of short-term allowances,
cities would have to release the associated allowances gradually. Yet if
local governments auctioned perhaps a year or two’s worth of supply
at a time, upzoning deals would not be binding at all, at least not by
virtue of the auction contracts.172 If anti-development forces gained
control of the city council, they could scale back, or simply halt, the
upcoming auctions. And regardless of who controls the city council, the
world of short-term allowances would invite on-going bickering over
how much developable space to release each year. The pressures that
cities now face about whether to adjust a legislated exaction or fee
schedule would return,173 but in a slightly different guise: the decision
would be about quantity (how much more of the envelope to auction
this year), rather than price (whether to raise or lower the fees and
exactions).174
To acknowledge these problems is not to say that the short-termallowance world would be just as bad as the status quo.175 The short171. Winning bidders would resell some of their allowances to builders today,
while banking the rest in the expectation that they will be worth more in
the future, as space within the expanded zoning envelope is gradually used
up.
172. The auction contract might specify procedures for permitting of projects
entitled with the use of the development allowances that the winning
bidders acquired, but it is hard to see how the contract could commit the
city to auctioning additional developable space in the future. Even if the
contract had such a term, the city could breach it at will, since the owner
of an existing development allowance would not suffer any damages
(indeed, would likely benefit) from the city electing not to make available
additional developable space in the future.
173. See supra Part I.C.
174. One can also imagine all sorts of dubious public efforts to time the market,
with cities downsizing their auctions whenever housing prices fall.
175. The world of short-term allowances would have a number of the auctionframework advantages we have discussed. It would allow cities to extract
more site value without the risk of overshooting and inadvertently
deterring development (because markets, not politicians, would set the
price). See supra Parts I.C, II.A. It would make cities bear the cost of
pointlessly convoluted and discretionary permitting regimes. See supra
Part III.A. It would provide state regulators with much-needed
information about whether the development capacity a city claims to have
made available is realistically available. See supra Part III.B. And it would
obviate the need for pointless “nexus” studies.
Moreover, the state could empower the political coalition behind a major
upzoning to commit to future allowance auctions using state
administrative law, regardless of the allowances’ duration. The auctionenabling statute might provide that if a local government, in a stateapproved plan, promises to auction at least x square feet of a specified
zoning envelope annually for a defined period of time, then the state
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term model has certain advantages; the long-term model has others.176
We remain agnostic about development allowances’ optimal duration.
It may also be possible to forestall the emergence of political alliances
between NIMBYs and owners of long-term development allowances by
creating a class of development allowances whose owners would be
entitled to a portion of any additional allowances created by future
upzonings. Rick Hills and David Schleicher have sketched a version of
this idea for TDR programs.177 Obviously there are downsides to it as
agency may conduct those auctions on the local government’s behalf
under the approved plan’s terms. The state-approved plan would preempt
any downzoning or permitting restrictions to the contrary that a later city
council might adopt. If the plan is locked in through a state administrative
approval that preempts contrary local regulations, then pro-housing
actors will be able to get a court order specifically enforcing the plan
(assuming the state statute so provides). By contrast, a party, such as an
owner of development allowances, who claims breach of a contract with a
local government normally can obtain only reliance damages. See Serkin,
supra note 95, at 916–17, 957–59 (noting that “development agreements”
that state statutes expressly authorized often enable the developer to get
specific performance against a local government, in contrast to the reliance
damages typically available for governmental breaches of a contract).
176. To summarize: The long-term model provides stronger fiscal incentives
for big upzonings with big (large number of allowance) auctions, by
allowing the local government to capture future development value in the
present. It also enables the local government to substantially lock in the
terms of that upzoning through allowance contracts. Finally, the longterm model should improve the flow of information to state regulators
about particular development constraints, as it would create arbitrage
opportunities for investors who locate constraints, buy inexpensive
allowances, then prevail upon the state agency or courts to remove the
constraints, and finally resell their allowances at a profit. The main
advantages of the short-term model are that it will not create a “buy and
hold” investor class opposed to future upzoning, and it is less prone to
certain transaction-cost problems that may occur after most of the longterm allowances for a zone have been redeemed. See infra Part IV.C.
Perhaps it is also worth noting that the long-term model might tempt
some local governments to commit to allowing a lot of development in the
future, while depriving future city councils of sources of revenue for
associated infrastructure (e.g., by writing into the auction contract that
no fee or exaction may be charged as a condition of project approval). We
are not much concerned about this, however, as the auction market would
provide an automatic check: the local government’s failure to plan for and
finance needed infrastructure would reduce what bidders offer of the
allowances. Also, the state agency that approves the auction plan could
require the local government to set aside a reasonable portion of the
revenue for capital needs.
177. Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions Out of Thin Air, supra note 25, at
116-17 (proposing “constant ratio” TDRs that would provide a bonus
defined with reference to base zoning; as base-zoning changes, so too
would the amount of additional height and density that could be built by
redeeming the TDR).
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well, such as reduced flexibility for future politicians to allocate the
surplus from future upzonings in the most expedient manner.
The bottom line is that figuring out the best possible structure for
a regime of upzoning with auctions will require some trial and error.
B.

Transaction Costs and the Allowance Endgame

Another objection to our proposal is that it introduces new
transaction costs into the development stream. In the auction world,
developers must not only assemble suitable parcels of land for their
projects, but also purchase the requisite allowances. If the allowance
market were liquid and competitive, this additional step would not
squander resources. Allowances would just be one more construction
input that the developer must buy, like steel or lumber, and the cost
would be similarly easy to budget for. But if the allowance market were
thin, with just a few transactions annually and a small number of
players, the transaction costs of assembling the necessary allowances
for a project could become significant. Development-allowance deals
would start to look more like land-assembly deals, with strategic
behavior and considerable ex ante uncertainty about what it will take
to get the deal done.
There are many ways for a state agency that reviews auction plans
to mitigate this problem. The agency could reject plans that would
distribute only a small number of allowances for some tiers or zones. It
could also set “minimum square footages” for allowance holdings,
disallowing the subdivision of allowances into bundles too small to
license a typical project in the zone.178 But eventually most of the
allowances in a tier will have been redeemed, and at that point the
market will be less than competitive. To keep transaction costs from
spiraling, the state might stipulate that all development allowances are
subject to a call option that would take effect when the number of
allowance holders falls below some threshold, allowing developers with
an approved project to force a sale of allowances at either their fair
market value or at the project’s estimated residual value.179 The point
is not to get the price just right through a complicated public procedure,
but to create a simple mechanism for forced transfers that will dissuade
holdout behavior by the last few allowance owners.
The state could also mitigate the end-game problem by making
allowances time limited. This is tantamount to a penalty default: if an
allowance owner failed to transfer her allowances to developers with
ready-to-go projects before the end of an allowance cycle, her allowances

178. There could be an exception allowing owners of small parcels to acquire
the number of allowances needed for their site.
179. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399 (2004)
(exploring the use of option contracts to mitigate transaction-cost
problems resulting from uncertainty about private valuations).
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would become worthless.180 A city could mitigate end-game transaction
costs by further upzoning the area in question and selling additional
allowances whenever a zone’s market becomes thin.181
Though end-game transaction costs are a concern under the auction
model, it is important to keep the big picture in view. This is only an
end-game problem, assuming each tier has many allowances initially.
The limited public role that may be needed to facilitate low-transactioncost transfers during end-game times should be much less
administratively taxing than the never-ending pressures to recalibrate
fees and exactions under the legislated-schedule model for value
capture, let alone the hassles of negotiating case-by-case development
agreements. For most end-game projects, allowance assembly will take
place privately, with little fuss, having been negotiated in the shadow
of a possible forced sale or penalty default.
C.

Upzoning Vetopoints

Another objection to our proposal is that it would give the state an
effective veto over local upzoning.182 Although the housing agency
would lack authority to block local upzoning ordinances, the agency’s
denial of an associated plan to auction allowances might cause the local
government to rescind or delay its upzoning in the hope of getting
approval for upzoning with auctions at a later date. Anticipating as
much, interest groups that favor restrictive housing policies would
lobby the agency to reject auction plans.
While we cannot rule out such scenarios, the risks must be weighed
against both the dangers of the status quo and the risks of strategic
downzoning, or worse, the use of auction contracts to entrench NIMBY

180. As discussed previously, supra Part IV.A, short-term allowances are also
less likely to generate a new anti-upzoning political force in the form of
allowance owners.
181. This assumes that the new allowances and the old allowances would be
fungible for use within both the expanded zoning envelope created at time
1 (in connection with the first auction, and the yet-further-expanded
zoning envelope created at time 2 (in connection with the second auction).
In anticipation of possible end-game issues, the allowance contracts
written for the first auction should allow for this. The first-auction
contracts should, however, probably disallow the issuance of new
allowances that would be merely dilutive of existing allowances, i.e., new
allowances for use within the time-1 envelope that do not also license
development in some further-expanded (time 2) envelope on the same
sites.
182. See Fischel, supra note 30, at 54–55 (noting that many state interventions
in the land-use space have had a “double veto” character, giving
development opponents a new forum in which to block projects, while
doing nothing to help proponents get socially-beneficial projects approved).
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policies in a world where local governments could auction development
allowances without state approval.183
In today’s high-cost, supply-constrained metropolitan regions, some
further inducement is clearly necessary to get local governments to meet
the demand for new housing. The interests that oppose dense residential
development at the local level—homeowners and neighborhood
groups—are not as well organized at the state level. Business interests,
which are well represented in state capitals, have a strong incentive to
lobby for pro-housing policies.184
On balance, we think the risk of the state housing agency being
captured by antidevelopment interests pales in comparison to the
dangers of the status quo, in which city council members who clog the
development pipeline are rewarded by neighborhood constituents.185
That said, a state policymaker who disagrees with our judgment
about relative risks might consider a more limited, targeted version of
our proposal, in which the only development rights that cities could
auction would be those created by a state statute that directly upzone
183. E.g., by promising through the auction contract not to upzone other
parcels in the future.
184. Increases in the regional housing supply will help businesses to recruit
more workers, and to the extent that housing-supply increases bring down
housing prices, they will raise the effective wage (purchasing power) paid
to a business’s workers at no cost to the business. See Marisa Kendall,
Stripe Gives $1 Million to Pro-Development YIMBY Group Tackling Bay
Area Housing Shortage, San Jose Mercury News (May 3, 2013),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/03/pro-development-yimby-groupscores-1-million-from-stripe-tackle-housing-shortage/ [https://perma.cc/
3JKR-965V] (describing how tech companies invest in housing to enable
employees to live near their office, reduce commute times, and improve
overall quality of life).
It could be objected that these business interests themselves represent a
powerful constituency capable of capturing state lawmakers and
propelling them to advance a different set of parochial interests. See
Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 959,
988 (1991) (observing that public choice theory does not offer clear
prediction which level of government is more susceptible to interest-group
capture). Without doubt, the state should not be seen naively as a white
knight, and, over the long run, assuming significant mitigation of the
current crisis, we acknowledge that the balance on housing policy might
swing back to localities. But, for the moment, given the intensity of the
crisis and its impact on constituencies better able to influence policy at
the state level, we think it is an easy call to support a shift to the state.
185. One might think that the developers would push local governments for
streamlined permitting, but politically connected developers benefit from
cumbersome, discretionary processes that cut out their competitors. See
O’Neill et al., supra note 28, at 75 (“Our interview data confirms that
well-capitalized developers with existing relationships and experience in
specific jurisdictions are the best situated to navigate these complex local
[development permitting regimes].”) (emphasis added).
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certain areas that local governments have traditionally resisted
developing, such as existing residential neighborhoods near transit.186
On the other hand, this more limited version of our proposal may result
in a thinner, less competitive market in development allowances, and
some cities might delay voluntary upzoning outside of the stateupzoned areas with the goal of later winning legislative authorization
to couple the contemplated upzoning with an auction.
D.

Cities with Market Power

Still another objection to our model is that large cities are not price
takers when it comes to housing. If they allow lots of development,
housing prices decrease; if they allow very little development, prices
stay high. Fiscally minded zoning by cities with market power will
therefore yield an inefficiently low quantity of housing, just as any other
monopolist produces too little of the good they have monopolized.187
This is a legitimate concern, but in our view the important question
is not whether big cities would allow less than an optimal amount of
housing, but rather whether they would allow more housing than they
do now. Consider again our San Francisco example. The city surely has
some market power. If San Francisco tripled its housing production,
housing prices in the city would probably come down somewhat. But
even if prices fell by a couple hundred dollars per square foot, the city
could still reap enormous sums from the allowance auctions.188 Whether
the city faces a flat demand curve (the price-taker scenario), or a
downward-sloping demand curve (the market-power scenario), we are
confident that local political entrepreneurs looking to capture and
redistribute the land-value residual would push for large-scale
upzonings if the city could auction the newly developable space.
We also think the appeal of a go-slow, do-not-upzone-too-muchlest-prices-fall strategy may be undercut by competition among the
jurisdictions in a metropolitan region. To continue with our running
example, housing units in Oakland, Berkeley, Mountain View, and
other Bay Area municipalities are substitutes, albeit imperfect, for
housing units in San Francisco. The demand curve for housing in San
Francisco therefore depends on the amount of housing that all the other
Bay Area jurisdictions have already produced, as well as how much
housing they are expected to produce in the future. The regional nature
of housing markets means that in the auction world, each jurisdiction

186. Thanks to David Schleicher for offering this suggestion.
187. Fischel, supra note 30, at 272, 277.
188. At housing prices of $1,150 per square foot, we ballparked the per-squarefoot residual at (0.8*$1150) – (2*$350 - $70) = $430, or $2.15 billion for
5,000 homes of 1,000 square feet each. At $950 per square foot, the total
residual for 5,000 homes would be about $1.35 billion.
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would benefit from being the first jurisdiction in its region to
substantially upzone and auction allowances.189
Epistemic uncertainties probably cut against the go-slow strategy
as well. Economists have shown that demand curves for housing can
only be estimated by making strong, basically unverifiable assump–
tions.190 Projections of future housing-demand curves in the postauction world would be even shakier, requiring serious guesswork about
how the supply of substitute housing in nearby jurisdictions will change
in response to the new fiscal incentive to upzone. So long as allowances
continue to fetch prices high enough to finance the goods or transfers
that hold the pro-development coalition together, we think most cities
(uncertain of the future, and wary of losing a possible early-mover
advantage) would enact prospective upzonings as quickly as possible,
rather than delaying with the hope of securing a better price for later
development allowances.
In principle, state lawmakers could check the market power of big
cities by devolving the rezoning-and-auction decision to neighborhoodlevel entities.191 Neighborhood-level decision-makers would be closer to
pure price takers, as there are good substitutes for most neighborhoods,
and no one neighborhood could much affect the regional housing supply.
But neighborhood-level institutions would probably be even more
homeowner-dominated than city councils. And, needless to say, cities
would fight mightily against any state initiative to shift rezoning
authority from city governments to new neighborhood-level insti–
tutions.
E.

Do Local Politicians Prefer In-Kind Exactions?

This is less an objection than a question about whether the local
right to auction development allowances, if created, would be widely
used. Professor Rachelle Alterman has studied land-value-capture
practices around the world, and one of her principal conclusions is that
indirect modes of value capture are much more common than overt

189. The size of the first mover advantage will depend on the degree of
uncertainty about future production throughout the region. If market
participants are very confident that prices will come crashing down in the
future, they will not pay a lot for allowances today.
190. See generally Saku Aura & Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and
Housing Prices, 99 Econ. Letters 275 (2008).
191. Some scholars envision rezoning occurring through a joint decision by
homeowners in a neighborhood to sell their properties to a developer. See
Nelson, supra note 24, 178–79. Japan apparently has a procedure whereby
two-thirds of the landowners in an area can petition for rezoning for higher
FAR, and the local government is required to act on the petition within
six months. Sorenson et al., supra note 109, at 570. We do not know
whether it is widely used.
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taxation of the surplus.192 She reports that, of the industrialized nations,
only Poland, the United Kingdom, and Israel have provided for benefit
taxes (special assessments) on upzoning’s value.193 And to the best of
our knowledge, only Brazil has authorized cities to auction development
allowances in connection with upzoning—and Brazil requires the
auction proceeds to be spent, like a benefit tax, on services for the
upzoned area.194 By contrast, the in-kind exactions, impact fees,
development agreements, and incentive-zoning ordinances now in favor
among U.S. municipalities have near counterparts around the world.195
Might we have overlooked some real advantage of these indirect
modes of value exaction? Relative to benefit taxation, the indirect
methods clearly do have advantages: they will not raise the ire of
liquidity-constrained landowners, and they don’t require a public
agency to accurately forecast the value conferred by upzoning. But
these advantages are shared by our auction model.
Another political attraction of in-kind value capture is that it may
allow local officials to more credibly commit to spending the value
extracted for certain purposes down the road.196 To illustrate, imagine
that affordable-housing advocates have strong allies on a city council
that is considering an upzoning plan. If the council pairs the upzoning
with a below-market-rate-housing requirement, it is more likely that
the upzoning will continue to yield affordable housing units years into
the future than if land-value residuals were extracted in cash for the
general fund. Though a future city council could repeal the belowmarket-rate requirement, the political transaction costs of doing so
would likely exceed the transaction costs of reducing general-fund
appropriations for affordable housing.197 Nothing intrinsic to our model,
however, requires auction revenues to be deposited in the general fund.
192. Rachelle Alterman, Land Use Regulations and Property Values: The
“Windfalls Capture” Idea Revisited, in The Oxford Handbook of
Urban Economics and Planning 755, 775 (Nancy Brooks et al. eds.,
2012).
193. Id. at 768.
194. For reviews of the Brazilian experience, see Suzuki et al., supra note
101, at 215–16; Paulo Sandroni, A New Financial Instrument of Value
Capture in São Paulo: Certificates of Additional Construction Potential,
in Municipal Revenues and Land Policies (Gregory K. Ingram & YuHung Hong eds., 2010); Kim, supra note 92, at 4.
195. Alterman, supra note 192.
196. Thanks to John Infranca for suggesting this point.
197. The municipal budget comes up for negotiation automatically every year
or two, and these negotiations provide lots of opportunities for horsetrading, whereas repealing a BMR requirement would require opponents
of the program to get their repeal measure onto the legislative agenda and
then overcome the various forms of status-quo bias that are built into the
legislative process (e.g., committee and mayoral veto points).
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We think many local governments would want to commit some portion
of the revenue to capital projects, and if other spending commitments
are reasonably necessary to hold the pro-development coalition
together, the state agency that approves the auction plan should let the
local government make these commitments.198 The commitments, once
approved by the agency, could become enforceable as a matter of state
law,199 thereby allowing city councils to make more credible spending
commitments through auctions than with in-kind public-benefit
schedules.
Indirect value capture may also appeal to politicians who want to
divide the upzoning pie in a manner that the public would regard as
unfair. When upzoning’s value is divvied up discreetly and in kind,
politicians may be able to divert more of that value to big campaign
donors and powerful interest groups than if value extraction were
transparent. But the Brazilian experience suggests that if cities receive
authority to auction the developable space created by upzoning, they
will use it eagerly.200 Brazilian cities jumped on board even though
Brazil’s capital markets were not well developed, and despite tight
restrictions on the use of auction proceeds.201 In the U.S., which has
well-developed capital markets and experience with other forms of
tradeable regulatory property, we expect an even more enthusiastic
reception than in Brazil.
F.

Would the Auctions Be Unlawful?

So far we have considered functional objections to our proposal, but
one might also wonder whether the auction model is simply foreclosed
by the Takings Clause, or perhaps by one of the various tax limitations
found in states’ constitutions.
We have noted that the Supreme Court’s Takings-Clause juris–
prudence imposes a nexus-and-proportionality requirement on property
exactions and fees.202 Under our proposal, the price of development
198. Our model does not require that localities foreswear development fees or
in-kind exactions, but forces the locality to internalize the costs of these
decisions. If a city retains the right to charge fees, and on a discretionary
basis, then this would reduce the value of the allowances. However, if a
city does give up fees, then prudence requires that it save a portion of its
allowance revenue for needed infrastructure. A middle road could be to
create a prudent capital fund from allowance revenues.
199. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. The City of San Paulo has
already raised nearly $2.8 billion with development rights auctions and
further auctions are in the offing. See Kim, supra note 92, at 8.
201. See Kim, supra note 92, at 4 (describing geographic and other limitations
on the use of auction proceeds); id. at 32 (comparing capital markets in
Brazil and the U.S.).
202. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
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allowances would be roughly proportional to the market value of new
housing, rather than to infrastructure needs or injuries attributable to
development. It might therefore be said that requiring landowners to
redeem allowances as a condition of receiving development permits is
unconstitutional.
This argument should fail, however, because the nexus-andproportionality requirement is best understood as governing only
discretionary conditions on development permits.203 Under the auction
model, the requirement that landowners redeem allowances to build
above the development baseline would be mandatory, and simple math
would determine the number of allowances for a given project.
This is not sophistry. Discretionary conditions are particularly
susceptible to favoritism and abuse. The courts that have complained
about local governments’ extortionate behavior should welcome our
proposal, for as we have seen, ours would actually encourage local
governments to curtail their own discretion, establishing clear-cut
standards and speedy procedures for project review.
The doctrinal line between discretionary and nondiscretionary
conditions is needed to keep the exactions jurisprudence from
swallowing numerous precedents that apply deferential standards of
review to everyday taxes and regulations. Property taxation has never
faced a congruence-and-proportionality requirement, and even special
assessments, which can vary from one parcel to the next, are reviewed
deferentially.204 As we explain below, the development-allowance
auction is akin to a special assessment on upzoning, but with built-in
protections for liquidity-constrained landowners and safeguards against
“overshooting,” i.e., taxing away more value than was actually
conferred. The precedents that give local governments a wide berth for
benefit taxation counsel for acceptance of the auction model too.
Or consider economic regulation. Zoning and other limits on
economic activity can become a taking in when they go too far, but the
Constitution doesn’t require nexus-and-proportionality studies as a
matter of course when governments enact pollution controls. Nor does
a state’s decision to control pollution by creating new forms of
regulatory property, such greenhouse-gas emission allowances, trigger
special Takings scrutiny. An auctioned right to build pursuant to an
upzoning plan is just another form of regulatory property.
We acknowledge, though, that at least one justice of the Supreme
Court, Justice Thomas, seems inclined to extend the nexus-and-pro–
203. As the California Supreme Court put it, “[t]he ‘sine qua non’ for
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is . . . the ‘discretionary deployment
of the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in individual
cases.’” San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal.
2002). See also Bldg. Indus. Ass’n—Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F.
Supp. 3d 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
204. See, e.g., Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915).
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portionality requirement to nondiscretionary development conditions.205
If nothing else, we think our framework would offer a good set of facts
to test Justice Thomas’s intuitions. Our proposal highlights what
should be the real focus of the takings inquiry in cases about
nondiscretionary exactions: the definition of the development baseline,
not the conditions placed on development in excess of that baseline.206
Our proposal also draws attention to the very strong state interests
that can be served by allowing local governments to profit from relaxed
land-use controls, and to the pervasiveness and diversity of
contemporary value capture practices.
The auctions might also be challenged on state-constitutional
takings or tax-limitation grounds. A state-by-state analysis is beyond
the scope of this Article. For now, we simply note that California’s
requirements for raising revenue are particularly fearsome; yet even in
California, the state could likely authorize upzoning auctions without
amending the state constitution.207

205. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S.Ct. 928, 928–29
(2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in cert. denial).
206. See generally Fischel, supra note 80.
207. Proposition 13 strictly limits property taxes and imposes a supermajority
requirement for most other kinds of taxes. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 1.
Proposition 218 limits, among other things, the imposition of “fees” as an
“incident of property ownership” or for a “property-related service.” Id.
art. XIIID. Proposition 26 constrains any government charge for any other
kind of public service. Id. art. XIIIC, §§ 1(e), 2. A challenge to
development-allowance auctions in California grounded on some
combination of these restrictions would be likely, but we do not think it
would succeed.
For starters, the allowances, though related to property value, are not
themselves a tax imposed on property value and therefore would not run
afoul of Proposition 13’s limitation on property taxes. See, e.g., Neilson
v. City of California City, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(parcel taxes are not ad valorem property taxes). Further, the allowances
are not a fee charged for governmental services, and so they are not likely
to fall under Proposition 218; that is, the auction allowances are not like
paying for garbage pickup. One might worry that Proposition 218’s notion
of an “incident of property ownership” might be interpreted broadly so as
to include the allowances. The California Supreme Court, however, has
already held that this does not extend to voluntary decisions to develop
one’s property. Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 526
(Cal. 2004).
Proposition 26, the sweeping catchall, does at first glance restrict “any
levy, charge or exaction,” yet it specifically excepts “a charge imposed as
a condition of property development.” Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 1(e)(6).
Tradeable development allowances fall squarely within this exception.
While the analogous proviso in Proposition 218 preserved only “existing
laws relating to the imposition of fees or charges as a condition of property
development,” id. art. XIIID, § 1(b), Proposition 26’s exception has no
such temporal limitation. The tradeable development allowance, as a
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Would the Auctions Be Unjust?

Setting aside the finer, doctrinal points, might there be some more
basic, normative objection? Perhaps yes, if the development baseline
were set significantly below the typical density of developed parcels in
the jurisdiction, or far below the buildable envelope allowed under
longstanding zoning classifications.208 But requiring the purchase of
development allowances by landowners who want to use the expanded
zoning envelope created or induced by a change in state law does not
deprive them of anything to which they might reasonably have felt
entitled.
The airwave spectrum offers an instructive analogy. Congress
required television broadcasters to switch to digital signals in 2009.209
This freed up the broadcast spectrum’s valuable, low-frequency bands,
which wireless phone carriers were eager to use. One might suppose
that, because they had previously used it, television stations owned the
low-frequency spectrum. But with the advent of digital broadcasting,
they no longer needed it, and Congress saw fit to allocate the freed-up
spectrum by auction.210 Just as technological changes and regulatory
mandates have made certain airwave spectrums newly available, the
buildable area created by state-induced upzoning is essentially a new
resource. The fortuity of owning land within the upzoned area no more
entitles landowners to the surplus than did the fortuity of broadcasting
over a particular portion of the spectrum entitle television stations to
reap the wireless windfall.
Another way of thinking about the fairness issue is by analogy to
special-benefit assessments (a form of benefit taxation). Consider a
property owner who has purchased a single-family home not far from a
transit stop. This homeowner did not buy the home to serve as a rental,
much less was she speculating about a zoning change. She bought the
home to live in herself at the market clearing-price of, say, $300,000.
Now suppose that a state or local government, having only glanced at
the first paragraphs of this Article, upzones all property near transit
novel sort of “charge imposed as a condition of property development,” is
therefore on safe ground.
Even if a court were to conclude that auctioning the upzone is subject to
Proposition 26, that would not kill the idea. Local governments would
just have to put their auction programs to a pre-implementation vote of
the municipal electorate.
208. Hence our suggestion to define the development baseline as the greater of
(1) the zoning of the parcel as of the date of the auction-authorizing state
statute, or (2) the median density of already-developed parcels in the
jurisdiction as of the same date.
209. DTV Delay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat. 122 (2009) (establishing a
transition date of June 12, 2009).
210. Jeffrey A. Hart, The Transition to Digital Television in the United States:
The Endgame, 1 Int’l J. Digital Television 7, 21–22, 25 (2010).
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stops. Our homeowner’s lot is actually large enough for a small
apartment building. Given the pent-up demand for housing, those
apartments would demand a premium and so, very soon after the state
law is passed, a developer offers our homeowner $1,000,000 for her
home.
Where did this $700,000 windfall come from? It was not a result of
any investments that were made in the single-family house, nor was it
the result of superlative work the developer may do in the future to
earn a sizable premium on the apartments she builds. Indeed, the
developer, if she knows her business, only offered $1,000,000 because
she knew she could afford to make this payment and still expect to
make acceptable profits, given the risk she is bearing. The $700,000
emerged because of a change in public regulation (zoning) that allowed
the property’s value to more fully reflect the value of other public
improvements, such as to the transit system.
Now suppose there was no public transit stop in this neighborhood,
just a collection of single-family homes worth, on average, $300,000.
The city then decides to build a transit system and to upzone the lots
nearby. Suddenly, all of the homeowners do not own $300,000 homes,
they own $1,000,000 homes. This $700,000 is a windfall from public
investment and should be publicly dispersed (at least in significant
part). Indeed, it is standard—and best—practice to impose a special
assessment on properties near transit stops before the project is built,
leveraging the projected windfall to make the transit investment in the
first place. Suppose this new transit stop will cost $10,000,000 and the
projected windfall to neighboring properties, collectively, is $5,000,000.
If special assessments worth $5,000,000 are imposed on the land, then
other taxpayers need to contribute only $5,000,000.
This is not only a fair and efficient outcome, but, given resource
and political constraints, it might be the only way to get the project
funded. A leading economic historian has argued persuasively that the
advent of benefit taxation was transformative for economic
development.211 If a major canal was only going to benefit one portion
of the state, how could the taxpayers of the entire state be expected to
fund it? Utilizing value capture was the key; it was efficient, it was fair,
and it broke a political impasse.212
Upzoning-with-auctions is close kin to benefit taxation, but with
two significant equitable advantages for current landowners.213 One is
211. See John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption:
American States and Constitutional Change 1842 to 1852, 65 J. Econ.
Hist. 211, 235 (2005).
212. Id. at 213, 222, 235.
213. Cf. George E. Peterson, The World Bank, Unlocking Land
Values to Finance Urban Infrastructure 37–38 (2009) (“Although
the concept of betterment levies is straightforward, implementation under
modern conditions has been unexpectedly difficult.”), available at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/723411468139800644/pdf/46
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the built-in limitation on overshooting, that is, extracting more value
than is actually conveyed. In the traditional special-assessment case,
the local government must assign some number, prospectively, to each
parcel’s expected increase in value. This is hard to do. The typical way
to proceed is to start with studies that demonstrate, by means of
regressions, the additional value similar transit projects generated for
nearby properties, and then argue why these results should be
replicated in this case. We do not doubt the robust findings that show
value added as a result of public improvement,214 but it is also well
understood that this is, necessarily, an inexact science.215
Even if a proposed special assessment does not overshoot, it may
stir up strong opposition from liquidity-constrained homeowners.216 An
assessment is a fixed charge on a parcel of land based on an increase in
value that owner-occupants will not have realized as cash flow. That a
home near an improved transit system is now worth more doesn’t mean
that the pensioner who owns it can afford the special assessment. In
short, traditional-benefit taxation requires a difficult judgment call on
valuation and compounds that difficulty with a liquidity problem for
many taxpayers.
The auction mechanism solves these problems. Obviously, only
investors with the resources to bid will participate, so there is no
imposition of a new obligation on liquidity-constrained landowners.
Further, if the market is working, allowance transfers will be voluntary
and no one will pay more than they think the allowances are worth. Of
course, the price of the development allowances will reflect not only
value contributed by public investment in transit, parks, and other
amenities—the traditional focus of special assessments—but also the
1290PUB0Box3101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TEHVBD2].
214. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Smith & Thomas A. Gihring, Financing Transit
Systems Through Value Capture: An Annotated Bibliography, 65 Am. J.
Econ. & Soc. 751, 751 (2006) (showing that “the elevated value effects
of transit access are well documented.”).
215. Susan S. Fainstein, Land Value Capture and Justice, in Value Capture
and Land Policies 21, 23–24 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong
eds., 2012); Philip A. Booth, The Unearned Increment: Property and the
Capture of Benefit Value in Britain and France, in Value Capture and
Land Policies, supra, at 74, 89–90 (summing up disappointing English
and French experience). But note that there are numerous case studies of
the successful use of value capture, see Peterson, supra note 213, and so
we are certainly not suggesting that value capture is not a vital and
effective tool, just one with limits. For a framework for use of benefit
assessments, see Darien Shanske, Clearing Away Roadblocks to Funding
California Infrastructure, 54 State Tax Notes 567 (2009).
216. Note that John Stuart Mill argued for using value capture and, at different
points, the United Kingdom attempted to capture value from upzoning
quite ambitiously, although each of these attempts ended in retreat. See
Booth, supra note 215, at 77–80.
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development value created by agglomerations of private enterprises and
individuals. Yet it is not clear why a site’s owner has any greater claim
to that value, as a matter of justice or fairness, than does the general
public.217 So long as the development baseline is reasonably defined, any
value above the baseline is just a windfall.

Conclusion
The public auction is a familiar and effective device for allocating
publicly owned resources to high-value users while ensuring that the
public receives a fair (market) price for its resource. The developable
space that could be created by an upzoning plan is a public resource in
all but name. Local governments, which control this resource, nowadays
expect cash and other benefits when they make this resource available
to private developers. This Article has argued that the states should
recognize this expressly and authorize local governments to auction the
amount of buildable space created by an upzoning plan.
Our argument is a pragmatic one. By authorizing local governments
to auction the upzone, states should be able to get high-cost,
supply-constrained cities to allow substantially more housing. The
framework we have sketched would give local governments a strong
fiscal incentive to allow dense development in high-value locations, and
to streamline development-permitting regimes. The framework would
also generate a policymaking asymmetry within local governments,
making it comparatively easy for local factions whose policy preferences
align with state goals to entrench their policies. Finally, the framework
would help state keep tabs on the amount of buildable space that is
realistically available for development within municipalities. Local
governments would have a fiscal incentive to not overclaim about the
development capacity created by their upzoning plans; and low prices
for development allowances (relative to the price of finished housing)
would signal the existence of serious development constraints.
We encourage legal scholars and state policymakers to think of
auctioning the upzone as one arrow in a quiver of policies for inducing
increased residential density in cities. This strategy could be paired with
state bills that directly upzone certain priority locations, such as sites
near transit (and it may to help soften opposition to such bills).218 It
217. Cf. John Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,
83 Yale L.J. 75, 127 (1973) (arguing for transferable development rights
programs, in part on the ground that “the development potential of
private property is in part a community asset allocable to serve the
community’s needs”).
218. California state senator Scott Wiener’s S.B. 50, which would have
required local governments to allow four- to five-story buildings near
transit stops, was drafted to give economically disadvantaged “sensitive
communities” a grace period to come into compliance. See Matt R.
Richardson, SB 50: Defining Sensitive Communities, Medium (Apr. 15,
2019), https://medium.com/dialogue-and-discourse/sb-50-defining-sensitive-
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could be deployed alongside measures to strengthen planning
mandates,219 such as California’s housing element law, or measures to
tie transportation funding to housing production.220 Upzone auctioning
could be supplemented with direct subsidies for increased residential
density, such as grant funding,221 or, in states like California that have
functioning carbon markets, offsets for local governments to sell on the
carbon market.222 Alone or in combination with other tools, auctioning
the upzone has the not insignificant virtue that cities are not likely to
resist it.
communities-d33e1988e2f8 [https://perma.cc/KRW4-87T9]. Professor Eric
Biber has helpfully suggested that our auction model could be combined
with an S.B. 50-like intervention, with a proviso giving sensitive
communities control over expenditure of auction revenues. Note also that
one of the principal lines of attack on state upzoning-near-transit bills has
been that they represent giveaways to developers. See, e.g., Tim
Redmond, Hearing on Wiener Housing Bill Points to the Roots of This
Crisis, 48Hills (Mar. 12, 2018), https://48hills.org/2018/03/hearingwiener-housing-bill-points-roots-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/WF5N-ZC2T].
This criticism would lose all force if local governments were authorized to
auction the newly developable space.
219. See generally Elmendorf, supra note 15.
220. Cf. Laura Bliss, California’s New Governor Would Punish Cities Over
Affordable Housing, Citylab (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/
transportation/2019/01/gavin-newsom-housing-reform-transportationbudget-homeless/580192/ [https://perma.cc/79R8-XRQZ] (discussing
Governor Newsom’s since-abandoned plan to tie local transportation
funding to housing production); Cecile Murray & Jenny Schuetz, Is
California’s Apartment Market Broken? 13 (2019) (recommending
that state policymakers tie transportation and other funding to housing
production), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2019/07/20190711_metro_Is-California-Apartment-Market-Broken-SchuetzMurray.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQJ4-8CAS].
221. Cf. Madeline Carlisle, Elizabeth Warren’s Ambitious Fix for America’s
Housing Crisis, The Atlantic (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2018/09/elizabeth-warrens-fix-americas-housingcrisis/571210/ [https://perma.cc/7UBX-KDCB] (discussing Senator Warren’s
proposal for a competitive block-grant program to reward cities that
reduce barriers to housing supply).
222. Dense housing near transit has quantifiable benefits for greenhouse gas
emissions and so localities that build denser development could be
permitted to profit from that choice by selling offsets on the carbon
market. See Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani, supra note 3. At the moment,
carbon-offset credits might not amount to a large incentive, but the
number of allowances in California is set to steadily contract, and the
price of allowances is expected to rise accordingly. By 2030, it is
imaginable that the fiscal incentive to sell allowances might be quite
significant. For some preliminary analysis, see Severin Borenstein et al.,
California’s Cap-and-Trade Market Through 2030: A Preliminary
Supply/Demand Analysis (Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper No.
281, 2017), https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP281.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DB88-AX3C].
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